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The behavior of several important macroeconomic variables has changed dramatically over
the past several business cycles in the U.S. These changes, which began around the mid-
1980s, have been viewed as somewhat puzzling given the stark contrast they exhibit to
earlier post-war data. The movement of output and employment has historically been highly
correlated throughout the different phases of the business cycle. However, this changed
with the economic recovery of 1991. Since then, periods of output recovery have been
accompanied by periods of prolonged job loss. These periods have come to be known as
“jobless recoveries”. Several competing explanations for this phenomenon have come forth,
however, all face similar limitations. To date, there has been no method presented to quantify
a period of jobless recovery. This makes comparisons across business cycles difficult and
also prevents formal statistical testing of the proposed explanations. This study creates
a meaningful measure of a jobless recovery which can be used to test these hypotheses.
Furthermore, jobless recoveries have only been studied using the national aggregate data.
This neglects potentially valuable information which may exist in the cross-section between
states. Using the jobless recovery measure, a state-level empirical analysis is conducted to
determine which, if any, of the existing explanations of jobless recoveries are supported by
the data. It has also been noted that the growth of output has experienced dramatic changes
over roughly the same period. The broad decline in the volatility of output since the mid-
1980s, named the Great Moderation, has become the subject of a large literature. However,
the literature has examined mostly data at the national-level. Using a proxy of quarterly
output, this paper provides state-level evidence of the Great Moderation and shows that
large, cross-state differences exist in the degree to which each state experiences the Great
Moderation. Explanations for why the Great Moderation exists in the national data are
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Introduction
The three most recent U.S. business cycles have seen dramatic departures from earlier cycles
with respect to the volatility and co-movements of several macroeconomic variables. Chief
among these are the decline in volatility of aggregate output growth and the divergence of
the growth rates of employment and output. Employment growth has historically followed
GDP growth very closely, and the nature of the relationship between output and labor was
thought to be well understood. However, in recent business cycles, employment growth has
been negative for extended periods into the economic recovery. These jobless recoveries have
puzzled economists and given birth to a literature which seeks to explain their emergence.
To date, the work on jobless recoveries has been constrained in at least two significant
ways. The first is the lack of a comprehensive measure capable of capturing the magnitude
of a given jobless recovery. Such a measure is desirable in order to make comparisons across
business cycles and across different economies. Without a comprehensive jobless recovery
measure, one cannot perform the statistical analysis necessary to test the existing hypotheses
on the causes of jobless recoveries. This first constraint is addressed in the first chapter of this
dissertation. A comprehensive measure for a jobless period is developed and then constructed
for the nation and the fifty individual states.
The second factor which has limited previous work on jobless recoveries is the lack of cross-
sectional analysis. Past research has focused only on the national time-series data, which
provides at best three instances of jobless recoveries in the post-war U.S. This limitation
is the focus of the second chapter of this dissertation. A panel study is conducted using
state-level data from 1960-2012. This provides fifty times the observations for each business
cycle allowing for much more robust statistical results. The state-level data, along with the
newly developed jobless recovery measure from chapter one, is used to test several of the
existing hypotheses on the causes of jobless recoveries.
Finally, chapter three of this dissertation addresses a similar problem in the literature
surrounding the Great Moderation. The Great Moderation is the name given to the period
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of significant decline in output volatility in the United States beginning around 1984. While
many have examined the national time-series data, few have analyzed output volatility across
economies. Chapter three conducts some empirical tests of the leading theories on the Great
Moderation using all fifty states. Thus, each chapter of this dissertation examines some recent
change in the movements of variables over the business cycle which is not well understood
and uses the statistically richer, state-level data to examine the competing hypotheses.
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Abstract
In the average recovery prior to 1990 for the post-war U.S., positive growth in output was
accompanied by positive growth in employment. However, in the three most recent business
cycles, the positive growth rate of output following the cyclical trough has been accompanied
by significant periods of continued job loss, causing economists to label these periods “job-
less recoveries.” While a sizable literature on this topic has developed, testing of proposed
hypotheses has been constrained by the lack of a meaningful way to measure the degree or
severity of a jobless recovery. As a result, there is little, if any, formal statistical tests of
these hypotheses. We construct a general measure of the magnitude of a jobless recovery
which exhibits many desirable properties for answering questions regarding the nature of
this recent phenomenon. In addition to the national data for the U.S., we also apply our
measure to the individual states, creating a database that allows for cross-sectional study of
the jobless recovery problem.
3
1 Introduction
”You take my life when you do take the means whereby I live”
- The Merchant of Venice, William Shakespeare (1600)
The issue of employment has long been one of the primary concerns of economics. The
behavior of aggregate employment during the business cycle was believed to be quite well
understood until recently. In the average recovery prior to 1990 for the post-war United
States, positive growth in output was accompanied by positive growth in employment. How-
ever, in the three most recent recessions, the positive growth rate of output following the
cyclical trough has been accompanied by significant periods of continued job loss, causing
economists to label these periods “jobless recoveries” (Groshen and Potter, 2003; Schreft
and Singh; 2003; Aaronson et al., 2004; Berger, 2012). As stated by Schreft and Singh, a
recovery is considered to be jobless “if the growth rate of employment in a recovery is not
positive,” and this definition is consistent throughout the literature. Thus, if the economy is
experiencing a recovery in output, yet there is no positive growth in employment, then this
recovery is classified as jobless.
This recent phenomenon is somewhat puzzling considering the remarkably strong his-
torical correlation between output and employment. Between 1960 and 1990, business-cycle
expansions in the USA came together with almost simultaneous increases in employment.
But sometime around the year 1990, this macroeconomic relationship changed, and in all
of the economic recoveries observed after that date, output growth was accompanied by
extended periods of continued job losses. In fact, the average correlation between quarterly
changes in output and quarterly changes in employment observed during business cycle ex-
pansions decreased from a strong 0.522 before 1990 to a much weaker 0.076 after 1990.1
1The correlation was calculated by comparing the first difference in the log-values of
non-farm employment and GDP strictly during business cycle expansions as defined by the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). We calculated the correlation for each
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These periods of positive output growth and negative (or zero) growth in employment are
the subject of a recent literature that attempts to understand their emergence.
Several alternative hypothesis exist about what may be causing the jobless recoveries.
Berger (2012), for example, argues that the drop-off in union power experienced in the 1980’s
has lead businesses to become more productive during recessions and necessitate less workers
during expansions, thus creating a jobless recovery. Groshen and Potter (2003) and Garin
et al. (2011) focus instead on the relocation of jobs across industries or regions. They argue
that the recent jobless recoveries result from the relocation of employment from shrinking,
unproductive sectors to expanding, productive ones which require less workers. Faberman
(2008) and DeNicco and Laincz (2013), in turn, have shown that jobless recoveries can be
traced back to the broad decline in the volatility of economic aggregates beginning in 1984
(known as the Great Moderation). Others like Koenders and Rogerson (2005) and Bachmann
(2011) provide an explanation based on employer’s labor hoarding behavior and unusually
long expansionary periods; while yet others like Aaronson et al. (2004b) consider the recent
rise in health care costs as a potential cause.
However, the joblessness of recent recoveries in the United States is an issue deserving a
great deal more attention than it is currently receiving. Economists cannot take lightly the
divergent trend between output and employment. The very foundations of macroeconomic
policy hinge on the premise that policies which stimulate aggregate output growth will
also add jobs to the economy. It is in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money that Keynes remarks, ”To dig holes in the ground, paid for out of savings, will
increase, not only employment, but the real national dividend of useful goods and services.”
Politicians and economists alike have made careers out of the assumption that fiscal policy
can simultaneously achieve these dual objectives. Yet the data seem to suggest an evolution
of the relationship between these two variables over time, implying a diminished, or at least,
increasingly delayed, impact of policy on the labor market. Research efforts aimed at better
particular period using quarterly data and report the averages: 0.522 for the period covering
1960-1990, and 0.076 for the post 1990 years. Employment data comes from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, GDP data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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understanding this relationship and the reasons behind a weaker correlation of output and
employment are paramount to current and future macroeconomic policy decisions.
Unfortunately, our ability to test the existing hypotheses has been constrained by two im-
portant limitations: 1. The lack of comprehensive measures capable of quantifying the extent
or severity of a jobless recovery; which hinders our ability to generate positive statements
and compare across business cycles. 2. The lack of cross-sectional statistical analysis at the
state or regional level; which prevents us from conducting tests that cannot be performed
using time-series data alone.
To grasp the importance of the first limitation, consider a simple comparison between the
jobless recoveries of 2001 and 2008. After the economic recovery of 2001 started, it took 21
months and 1,078,000 jobs lost for employment to reach its lowest point and start growing
again. In comparison, after the recovery of 2008 started, it took 8 months and 1,259,000 jobs
lost for employment to accomplish that same feat.2 Thus, if one looks at the time it takes
for employment to join the expansionary cycle, the jobless recovery of 2001 can be said to
be worse than that of 2008. But if one looks at the amount of jobs lost during the recovery,
then the recovery of 2001 can be said to be better than that of 2008. One would like to
discuss whether jobless recoveries are becoming more or less pronounced, but one cannot do
so without a more comprehensive measure.
In similar fashion, to recognize the importance of the second limitation, consider the
problem of testing a particular hypotheses about the causes of jobless recoveries. If it were
true, for example, that the advent of just-in-time hiring practices are responsible for the
emergence of jobless recoveries, as suggested recently in a paper by Panovska 2012, then we
should expect these type of recoveries to be more prevalent or severe in places where just-
in-time employment practices are more widespread. But it is impossible to conduct such a
test using aggregate, national data alone. Cross-sectional studies are better suited for that
task and can help improve our understanding.
2Total Non-Farm employment data from US Bureau of Economic Analysis was used to
compute these numbers.
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Our paper is concerned with these constraints. In the paper, we first propose a single,
comprehensive measure of jobless recoveries. The proposed measure maps the percent of jobs
lost, the length of time over which that job loss is observed, and the simultaneous changes
in output that occur, into an easy-to-calculate number that we label “the jobless recovery
depth” or JRD. We illustrate the properties of this measure using quarterly, time-series
data at the national level for the USA, as is standard in the literature. We then compute
the measure independently for all 50 states and all business cycles since 1960 and these
calculations are made available to the public for future research.3
In order to compute our JRD measures, quarterly data on output and employment is
required. For the most part, such data is available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). When computing the JRD values at
the state level, however, we were faced with the problem of not having a valid source for
quarterly, state-level GDP statistics.4 We thus resorted to using data on the states’ personal
income accounts (earnings by place of work account in particular), also from the BEA,
as an approximation. At the annual frequency, the average correlation coefficient between
the states’ GDP levels and the states’ earnings by place of work is 0.9977. Of course, we
cannot evaluate whether such a strong correlation is also observed at the quarterly frequency
(quarterly, state-level GDP measures do not exist), but the evidence we examine suggests
earnings by place of work are indeed a good approximation for the states’ GDP levels.
Our results at the national level indicate jobless recoveries began with the expansion of
1991 and became increasingly severe after that. More specifically, we find an increase of
204% in the national JRD measure between the 1991 and the 2001 recoveries, and a 142%
increase between the 2001 recovery and the still on-going recovery of 2008. Thus, using our
comprehensive JRD measure, any questions of whether jobless recoveries are indeed taking
place at the national level, or whether a significant change in the aggregate GDP-employment
3The JRD state-level database and accompanying code are available on Dr. Fabio
Mendez’s website, http://evergreen.loyola.edu/fmendez1/www/
4No source for quarterly, state-level, GDP statistics is currently available. Although the
BEA is expected to produce state-level, quarterly GDP measures in the near future.
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relation took place around 1990, are settled. Interestingly, our results also indicate that the
sharp change observed in the 1990’s was preceded by a mild but noticeable trend in the
JRD dating back to 1975; a finding which has been previously overlooked but might provide
valuable information regarding the causes of jobless recoveries.
In addition, a completely new set of insights arises when the state-level JRD measures
are studied. To begin with, our results indicate that the jobless recovery phenomena is not
a nation-wide occurrence, but a local event confined within a cluster of states that expands
slowly from the 1991 recovery to the recoveries of 2001 and 2008. This finding underlines
the importance of using cross-sectional statistical analysis as a complement for the type of
aggregate, time-series studies currently available in the literature and makes it possible for
one to test the validity of alternative hypothesis about jobless recoveries in a completely
different way.
The jobless recovery measure derived in this paper will allow future research to make real
progress in understanding the nature and causes of jobless recoveries in the United States.
This, in turn, will open the door to a better understanding of how macroeconomic policy
fulfills its dual objective in today’s economy. The goals of this paper, however, are to present
a general form of the JRD measure and then construct the measure using data for the nation
and the individual states. Furthermore, we discuss the construction of our measure and its
resulting strengths and weaknesses for application in future work. Although we leave the
formal testing of current jobless recovery hypotheses for future work, we discuss in this
paper what is learned from simple inspection of our measure alone. As already mentioned,
we see that jobless recoveries at the national level became obvious in 1991, but have been
monotonically increasing in severity since 1975. We also find that jobless recoveries have
existed for certain states in each business cycle since 1960, long before the phenomenon
appeared in the national aggregate data. Furthermore, we see that not all states experience
jobless recoveries, even when they appear at the national level. Finally, the magnitude of
jobless recoveries varies widely across states and time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents evidence on the
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existence of jobless recoveries, Section 3 discusses the national and state-level data used
and modifications made to them, Section 4 introduces the Jobless Recovery Depth (JRD)
measure that we propose in this paper and illustrates its properties using both national
and state-level data, Section 5 shows there is significant variation in the jobless recovery
experiences across states, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Evidence of Jobless Recoveries at the National Level
In this section, we present some evidence on the existence of jobless recoveries. We begin
by taking the definition of a jobless recovery that is commonly found in the literature and
applying it to past recessions, including the Great Recession. We then establish that each
of the three most recent recessions has been followed by a jobless recovery, consistent with
the literature. Following sections will present some additional tools for measuring the “job-
lessness” of any given economic recovery. We will apply these measures to the post-war U.S.
data to determine the length and severity of joblessness in each recovery, and to detect any
possible trends.
The recovery following the 1990-91 recession was the first in post-war U.S. history to
be labeled jobless, and it was followed by another jobless recovery after the 2001 recession.
The joblessness of these two recoveries has been documented in the literature (Groshen and
Potter, 2003; Schreft and Singh; 2003; Aaronson et al., 2004). As stated by Schreft and
Singh, a recovery is considered to be jobless “if the growth rate of employment in a recovery
is not positive,” and this definition appears to be consistent with the literature as a whole.
Thus, if the economy is experiencing a recovery in output, yet there is no positive growth in
employment, then we classify that recovery as jobless. Berger (2012) also provides evidence
that these two recoveries were jobless, while extending his analysis to include the Great
Recession of 2008-2009.
The business cycle is characterized by periods of economic contraction and economic
growth. The trough of a business cycle is the point at which the contraction ends and the
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expansion begins. Thus, a recovery begins at the trough of a business cycle, and ends when
the previous peak is once again attained. In order to determine whether or not a given
cycle contains a jobless recovery, one must consider how the economy gains or loses jobs
immediately following the trough. Figure 1 simply plots total nonfarm employment for the
U.S. in the post-war era. Periods of recession are shaded in gray, meaning that recoveries
begin where the shaded areas end. From this figure, we see that the post-1990 recessions
appear to differ from the typical post-war recessions in that employment does not turnaround
immediately following the start of a recovery. Rather we observe periods of continued decline
or stagnation in employment extending well beyond the end of the recession. In pre-1990
business cycles, positive growth in employment lagged the positive growth in output at the
start of a recovery by at most one quarter. In many cases, employment began its recovery
in the same quarter as output. The movement in these two series was highly correlated in
both the recession and recovery phases of the cycle. Beginning with the recovery in 1991,
we observe a change, where these two series still move together during periods of recession,
but then diverge for significant lengths of time into the recovery. (Individual plots of both
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Figure 1: Total Nonfarm Employment (thousands). The shaded areas indicate NBER defined
recessions. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
As previously stated, in order to determine whether or not a given cycle contains a jobless
recovery, one must consider how the economy gains or loses jobs immediately following the
trough. Using total nonfarm payroll employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Current Employment Statistics (CES) for the post-war era, we plot the growth path of
employment around the troughs of each recession in Figure 2. We normalize employment at
the time of the trough to one for each cycle. The four series plotted are each of the three
most recent recessions and the average of the post-war recessions from 1960 up through the
1980s. Figure 2 depicts the degree to which employment continued to decline, relative to
the start of the recovery, as well as how long it took to begin adding jobs, and how long
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it took for jobs to fully recover to their pre-recovery and pre-recession levels. From this
figure, a quick visual examination of the data shows quite clearly that the three post-1990
recessions were each accompanied by jobless recoveries. At the same time, we are able to see
how different these jobless recoveries have been from the average post-war recovery. This is
highly suggestive that these recoveries have indeed been jobless, and that jobless recoveries
may be the new norm as proposed by Schreft and Singh (2003). It should be further noted
how the jobless recoveries differ from one another when comparing the relative magnitude of
continued job loss, and the duration of joblessness. An examination of this figure may also
lead one to ask whether the condition of joblessness is a phenomenon that is worsening over





































































































































Figure 2: Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; author’s calculations
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3 Description of the Data
3.1 National Level
The national data for the U.S. used in this paper comes from two main sources. The national
employment data for the U.S. comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS
databases include data on total employment, total hours, and hours per worker, among
others, from 1947 to 2012. As a measure of total employment, the seasonally adjusted total
nonfarm employment as reported by the Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey is
used, consistent with the literature (Schreft and Singh, 2003; Aaronson, et al., 2004; Berger,
2012).
As a measure of national output, the quarterly real GDP data comes from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). This series is in 2005 chained dollars and is seasonally adjusted.
Monthly and quarterly dates for peaks and troughs in the business cycle are taken from
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee, the
accepted authority on business cycle dating. Using real GDP as the measure of output in
this paper is appropriate as it is one of the main measures of economic activity considered
by this committee in determining the dates of recessions and expansions.
For both total nonfarm employment and quarterly real GDP, analysis will only be done
including the years 1960 to 20125. Although data for nonfarm employment and GDP are
available going back to 1947, there were significant changes made in both statistics that make
comparisons between the pre-1960 and post-1960 periods potentially problematic. Bailey
(1958) discusses how revisions made to the industrial classification system effect BLS em-
ployment statistics. He notes that, beginning in 1960, ”all national employment statistics
published by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics will be revised ac-
cording to a new classification system.” He continues to emphasize the potential issues by
5Although national GDP data for 2013 became available just prior to the completion
of this draft, it was still not available at the state level. Thus, 2013 data has not been
incorporated into this draft.
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stating, ”The extensive revision of the coding structure will have a sizable impact on the
continuity of a number of the BLS series, since the composition of many individual industries
has changed significantly.” Also, between 1947 and 1960, the BEA went through several com-
prehensive revisions, resulting in statistical, definitional, and presentational changes. This
presents a potential issue for both the employment and GDP series before 1960. In addition,
choosing to work only with the data beginning in 1960 or later is consistent with the extant
literature on jobless recoveries (Berger, 201; Groshen and Potter, 2003; Schreft and Singh,
2003).
Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004) provide a very clear and detailed description of
the BLS’s two major employment surveys: the payroll survey coming from the Current Em-
ployment Statistics, and the household survey from the Current Population Survey. Both are
monthly surveys and designed to be nationally representative. Those interested in a detailed
description of the respective survey methods, the quantity of households or establishments
surveyed, what is actually being counted as employment, and the methods for extrapolating
these survey results to the whole population should refer to their paper. They detail poten-
tial flaws and biases that exist in each survey, and conclude by stating their opinion that the
payroll survey (from the Current Employment Statistics) is generally the more accurate of
the two. In addition, the majority of the existing work done in the area of jobless recoveries
has used the CES. Therefore, employment data from the CES is used throughout the paper.
3.2 State Level
State-level employment data is also taken from the BLS. Monthly total non-farm employment
data for each state is available from 1960-2012, however it is not seasonally adjusted. In order
to get a seasonally adjusted series of employment for each state over the desired sample
period, we seasonally adjust the data using the X12 ARIMA seasonal adjustment program
from the United States Census Bureau.
Recall that GDP was used as a measure of output at the national level. However, state-
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level GDP data coming from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts and is only available
annually from 1963-2012. Annual data does not allow one to properly observe the changes
in variables throughout the business cycle. Since we need data that is at least available at a
quarterly frequency, we must find a proxy for GDP at the state level that is available at the
desired frequency.
Personal income data by state is reported on a quarterly basis by the BEA. One of
these components, called earnings by place of work, was chosen as our proxy of state output.
According to the BEA, ”Earnings by place of work is the sum of Wage and Salary Disburse-
ments, supplements to wages and salaries and proprietor’s income. BEA presents earnings
by place of work because it can be used in the analysis of regional economies as a proxy for
the income that is generated from participation in current production.” Thus, we feel that
earnings by place of work has the potential to be a reasonably strong proxy for state output.
Henceforth, earnings by place of work will be referred to as simply earnings for short.
Additional adjustments must be made to the earnings data to make the series more
comparable to the measure of output used at the national level (GDP), and to allow for
meaningful comparison across time and states. The earnings data is nominal and not sea-
sonally adjusted. We first seasonally adjust the earnings data for each state using the X12
ARIMA process discussed above. The nominal, seasonally adjusted series is then converted
into real earnings using the GDP deflator. This provides a real, seasonally adjusted earnings
measure for each state which can be used as a proxy for output.
Other proxies for output face challenges either in the frequency or range of the available
data. For instance, GDP by state is available over the desired range, but only at an annual
frequency. Data on commercial electricity consumption by state, which is believed to be
highly correlated with production, is avaiable monthly, but only as far back as 1990. Since
both of these alternative proxies have their shortcomings in the context of this particular
study, they cannot be used here.
The data seem to support the claim of the BEA that earnings by place of work may
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proxy well for production. The average correlation coefficient between annual state GDP
levels and annual state earnings by place of work is 0.9977. Thus, at the state level, the
correlation between GDP and our proxy seems very strong when using the annual data. Of
course, we cannot evaluate whether this is also true when using quarterly data (quarterly,
state-level GDP measures do not exist); but we still made an effort to document the quarterly
correlation at the national level. National data for both GDP and earnings by place of work
are available at a quarterly frequency and have a correlation of 0.7272. Both the annual
state-level correlations and the quarterly national-level correlations suggest that earnings is
indeed a reasonable proxy for GDP.
In addition, given that for the purpose of calculating the JRD we require an approxi-
mation for the percentage changes in GDP and not for the GDP levels themselves, we also
looked at how annual changes in earnings at the state level correlate with annual changes
in state-level GDP. We conducted standard OLS regressions between the state-level, annual
changes in GDP and the corresponding state-level annual changes in earnings. In these re-
gressions, earnings are significant at the 1% level for all 50 states and explain about 75.6%
of the observed variation in GDP, on average (the average R-squared for the 50 regressions
was 0.756).
4 The Jobless Recovery Depth and Other Measures of Jobless Recoveries
4.1 Unsophisticated Measures of Duration
Although evidence has been provided on the existence of jobless recoveries, there has been
little to no attempt made to measure them in a meaningful way. Questions regarding the
severity of a jobless period and whether there is a discernible trend or pattern over time are
difficult to answer without meaningful measures. Using the definition of a jobless recovery
from Schreft and Singh (2003), recall that a recovery is considered to be jobless “if the
growth rate of employment in a recovery is not positive.” This definition is consistent with
the related literature. We begin by constructing a simple measure out of this definition:
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merely counting the number of months or quarters that a given recovery was jobless. This is
accomplished by calculating the number of quarters or months where positive output growth
was accompanied by nonpositive employment growth, once again using the NBER defined
cycle troughs as the start of a recovery. This is reported in Figure 3 using national data.
The results from counting the number of jobless quarters are redundant, so only monthly
measures are reported here.
This simple definition we have taken from the literature for a jobless recovery generates
nothing more than a simple indicator variable. At any given point in time, a recovery is
either jobless, or it’s not; a 1, or a 0. The issue with creating a binary variable to use
in our analysis of jobless recoveries is that, apart from duration, it tells us nothing about
how these jobless periods have differed from one another. (It should be noted that the
simple measure of duration this provides is alone an improvement over the previous research
on jobless recoveries). Comparing a 1 to a 1 in different business cycles suggests these
jobless periods are the same. Does it seem likely that all periods of time defined as jobless
are equal? The data clearly suggest otherwise, yet with this simple indicator variable, we
glean no additional information. This simple classification neglects important details in the
movements of these variables over time. One example is that it fails to account for the
relative magnitude of job losses and gains. In fact, the losses to total employment incurred
over the jobless period following a recover may not be regained for many months or even
years. This may be accompanied by strong or weak growth in aggregate output, and the
weakness of the labor market relative to output growth is lost on a binary variable. Apart
from producing the simple measures of duration reported in Figure 3, this indicator variable
for jobless recoveries can tell us little else. Yet there has been no previous attempt made to




































































































































Figure 3: Unsophisticated measures of duration using monthly data
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For example, in the recovery following the Great Recession, there were only three jobless
quarters according to this aforementioned definition. However, it took eight quarters for
employment to regain its pre-recovery level. Meaning that two years after output began to
recover; jobs had experienced zero net growth relative to the start of said recovery. Could one
not also argue then that this whole period of time could be considered jobless? We see that
the determination of how long joblessness lasts during a recovery depends very strongly on
the interval of time being considered. If instead of using quarterly data, one used annual or
monthly data as the interval of time, one might find that relatively longer or shorter periods
fall under the jobless recovery label currently being used in the literature. Thus, measuring
the length of time it takes for employment to reach a positive net gain relative to the start
of the recovery may be an informative measure for joblessness as well. This measure is also
presented in Figure 3. Moreover, we feel it is meaningful to quantify the length of time
it takes for total employment to return to its pre-recession peak, in other words, how long
it takes for employment to make a full recovery. This count is also presented in Figure 3.
Inspecting Figure 3, we see that according to all of these measures the post-1990 recoveries
have been jobless. Additionally, we see that most of these measures suggest a trend towards
recoveries with an increasingly long duration of joblessness over time. This provides further
evidence of a change in the economy away from the historical relationship between output
and labor.
4.2 The Relative Job Loss
Although meaningful, these simple counting measures offer only a glimpse of what can be
gained from quantifiably measuring jobless recoveries. We now propose a new measure
of employment during the business cycle that should be much more informative. In the
macroeconomic and econometrics literatures, there is a useful measure for gauging the depth
of a recession at any point in time known as the Current Depth of Recession (CDR). CDR
was first proposed by Beaudry and Koop (1993). CDR is defined as the gap between the
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economy’s historical maximum level of output, and its current level. It is given by, CDRt =
max[Yt−j]j≥0−Yt, , where Y is the natural log of output. The Current Depth of Recession is
a very nice measure in the sense that its construction is exceedingly simple, yet it contains a
great deal of information. Since it is calculated using logs of the data, it displays the depth as
a percentage variation from the historical maximum. This allows for clean comparisons across
business cycles, where examining data in levels can clearly be misleading. Furthermore, CDR
itself contains information pertaining to the length of time of a recession, and the length of
time of a recovery in a manner that is easy to discern from a simple inspection of the data.6
By applying a similar methodology, we construct a comparable measure for the employ-
ment time series which we will name simply Job Loss (JLt). Following the CDR literature,
the JLt variable is formed by calculating the gap in the historical maximum value of em-
ployment, and the current value. We make one minor adjustment. Instead of comparing
each point in time to the current historical maximum value over the entire series, we restrict
the maximum to the within-cycle maximum. This is done to insure that values from one
business cycle are not being compared to maximum values from previous business cycles.
In a few instances, it is actually the case that the historical maximum occurs in an earlier
cycle, significantly distorting the measure.
For this reason, we introduce our measure using a generic, standard representation of
a business cycle where output growth is negative during recessions and positive during ex-
pansions. Using this representation, a full business cycle is defined as the period of time
that begins on the date that marks the initiation of the economic decline, continues over
the trough and the subsequent expansion, and ends when the economy stops expanding
and another cycle begins. We arbitrarily choose to label the moment when the recovery
begins as “t = 0”. Similarly, we choose to represent the beginning of the business cycle as
“t = tbegin”, and its end as “t = tend”. That is, at any time t ∈ (tbegin, tend), we measure
job losses as JLt = max{Lj}j∈(tbegin,t) − Lt; where L represents the logarithm of the em-
ployment level and JLt stands for “job loss at time t”. Where the “peak to peak” business
6For evidence in favor of using CDR in time-series analysis, see Jansen and Oh (1999)
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cycle intervals employed for the beginning and end dates are those established by the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research (the intervals are: [1960q2, 1969q4), [1969q4, 1973q4),
[1973q4, 1980q1), [1980q1, 1981q3), [1981q3, 1990q3), [1990q3, 2001q1), [2001q1, 2007q4),
and [2007q4, 2012q47)).
The JLt measure is plotted in Figure 4. As far as we are aware, this is the first and only
attempt that has been made to apply such a measurement methodology to the employment
series. This innovative measure allows us to address many of the shortcomings of relying
on the simple definition of a jobless recovery used in the previous literature. However, As
noted by Gali, Smets and Wouters (2012), jobless recoveries cannot be measured by drops
in employment alone; but by changes in employment relative to the concurrent changes
in output. So if two recoveries generate identical job losses, but one takes place during a
period of strong output growth while the other takes place during a period of moderate
output growth, then the desirable jobless-recovery measure should distinguish between these
two different experiences. Arguably, when jobless recoveries are characterized by stronger
output growth, the job losses experienced should be weighted heavier, and the measure
should take on greater values.
Thus, we apply our modified version of Beaudry and Koop’s measure to output, and
name the new variable Output Loss (OLt). That is, at any time t ∈ (tbegin, tend), we measure
output losses as OLt = max{Yj}j∈(tbegin,t)− Yt; where Y represents the logarithm of output8
and OLt stands for “output loss at time t”. Plotting both JLt and OLt together in Figure 4,
we see supporting evidence of the existence of jobless recoveries shown in the previous section.
In each pre-1990 recession, growth in employment lagged growth in output by at most one
quarter. Here, we gain additional information as we also see that full recovery in employment
lagged full output recovery by at most one quarter. This simply confirms the remarkable
strength of the historical correlation between employment and output. The change after
1990 is once again obvious. Employment growth lags output growth by much longer periods
7The last business cycle is ongoing, and the next peak has not yet been established. Here,
we use the last quarter for which data is available
8given here by seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP in 2005 chained dollars.
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of time, with the economy continuing to shed jobs in some cases even after output has fully
recovered. Note that there is no significant or noticeable change in the correlation between
output and employment during the recession phase of the business cycle. The change that
has taken place in the economy over the last several business cycles seems to have explicitly
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Figure 4: This figure illustrates the percentage changes in employment and output, relative
to the peak of their corresponding cycle. Output data used are real, seasonally-adjusted,
quarterly GDP series from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Employment data used
are total non-farm employment series from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Seasonally
adjusted series are provided monthly by the BLS and are aggregated here to a quarterly
frequency using the 3-month average.
The ability to aid in answering questions regarding the severity, length, and trend of
jobless recoveries is perhaps the most important application of the newly constructed JLt
measure. However, as we will show in the following section, we believe it may also be valuable
in testing the existing theories on the causes of jobless recoveries. Inspecting Figure 4, it
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appears that the last three recessions have been increasing in joblessness as measured by
JLt. However, as already mentioned, the real question of interest is not just the depth
of joblessness, but how much of that joblessness is not explained by the current depth of
recession. For example, in the 1975 recovery, the JLt was larger than in the jobless recoveries
beginning in 1991 and 2001. However, the recovery beginning in 1975 has not been considered
jobless. To account for the fact that jobs naturally decline more when the decline in output
is larger, consider the Relative Job Loss (RJLt),
RJLt = [max{Lj}j∈(tbegin,t) − Lt]− [max{Yj}j∈(tbegin,(t−1)) − Yt−1]
Here, Yt is given by the natural log of output, Lt is given by the natural log of total
nonfarm employment, and RJLt stands for the relative job loss at time t. This index
is displayed from 1960-2012 in Figure 5. We use the one-quarter lag of OLt in order to
be consistent with the fact that employment has historically lagged output by about one
quarter, (Koenders and Rogerson, 2005). Also, when one does not use the one quarter
lagged value of OLt, one gets a large one-quarter spike appearing in the difference between
the two series at the peak and trough of each business cycle. Rather than have these large,
one-quarter long spikes in our measure for each business cycle, we choose to lag our output
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Figure 5: The Relative Job Losses (RJLt), the difference between JLt and OLt−1 from 1960
to 2012
How does one interpret RJLt? Recall that both OLt and JLt were derived from natural
logs of the data, so that we were already dealing with percentage deviations from historical
maximums at any given time. From a mere visual inspection of the recent Great Recession,
we see that RJLt reaches a value of approximately .04. This tells us that employment at
this point in time was about 4 percentage points further from full recovery than output was
one quarter earlier. Remember, we normally expect employment to lag output by about a
quarter. Let’s examine the exact values for each measure. During the Great Recession, RJLt
reached a maximum value of .043 in the first quarter of 2011. At this time, JLt was .053,
meaning total employment in the U.S. was 5.3% lower in the first quarter of 2011 than at it’s
pre-recession peak. OLt was .01 a quarter earlier, meaning that GDP on the other hand, was
only 1% lower than its pre-recession peak. This implies that relative to output’s distance
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to full recovery, employment was still 4.3 percentage points behind. This is the Relative
Job Loss. From Figure 5 we see that employment is progressively lagging behind output
by greater magnitudes and greater lengths of time. The newly constructed variable RJLt
suggests that jobless recoveries are growing more severe in magnitude, or depth, as well as
in duration. Most interestingly, this pattern seems to extend back to the 1970s. Using only
the unsophisticated binary definition of a jobless recovery discussed previously, one fails to
noticed the divergence in the behavior of output and employment that was occurring well
before the first universally recognized jobless recovery.
Figure 6 presents a cleaner view of the depth and duration of each recession from 1960-
2012. The measure of depth being plotted comes from our newly constructed index, RJLt.
The depth values in the figure are the greatest level of relative joblessness for each business
cycle, that is, the peaks from Figure 5. For duration, RJLt was also used. It is a simple
count of the number of consecutive quarters that had a positive RJLt in each business cycle.
It should be noted, however, that total nonfarm employment in the United States has still
not fully recovered at the time of this writing. Therefore, the last observation for duration
in Figure 6 will continue to grow as new data becomes available. Also, a comparison of
the duration graph and Figure 3 shows that our newly constructed index for joblessness is
consistent with our more elementary counting measures of duration. The main addition in
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Duration - Consecutive quarters of joblessness for each recovery using RJL
Figure 6: Depth and duration of joblessness, as measured by RJL
As mentioned before, a meaningful measure for joblessness that is not a binary variable
may allow for more accurate analysis of the existing theories regarding the causes of jobless
recoveries. Moreover, for certain types of analysis, one may wish to use a continuous variable
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in place of the RJLt variable which is not continuous. Recall that by design, periods that are
not jobless return a value of zero for RJLt. The jobless periods alone return positve values,
which are themselves continuous, and vary in magnitude given the relative changes in output
and employment. It is possible to construct similar variables that are continuous. These
corresponding continuous measures for both JLt and OLt, as well as RJLt, are presented in
Appendix B of this paper.
4.3 The Jobless Recovery Depth
As shown in figure 4, the relative job loss (the vertical distance between curves) takes on
the expected values. That is, the difference between the employment and output losses is
close to zero at all points in time before 1990 and increasingly positive for the expansionary
periods that begin around 1991, 2001, and 2008. But figure 4 not only shows the two
lines have separated vertically; it also shows they have separated horizontally. This growing
horizontal distance between the lines indicates that employment losses have become more
resilient; that while employment losses before 1990 tended to disappear at the same time as
the corresponding output losses, they tend to linger for much longer after 1990.
Thus, when constructing the ideal jobless recovery measure, one should make sure to
incorporate this additional time dimension. We do that here by measuring the difference
between the employment and output losses cumulatively, throughout the duration of the





[max{Lj}j∈(tbegin,t) − Lt]− [max{Yj}j∈(tbegin,(t−1)) − Yt−1]
9Panovska 2012 discusses how the changes in labor market variables and other real vari-
ables that characterized jobless recoveries can be observed throughout the entire cycle and
not just the recovery. Koenders and Rogerson 2005 point out how it is not optimal to com-
pare across business cycles while using the recovery part of the cycle alone, specially when
the downturns that precede those recoveries have been different.
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Several properties of the JRD must be noted. First, that since employment has his-
torically followed output with a one-period lag, it makes sense to use lagged output values
instead of current values. We do so in all of our calculations. Second, that since the JRD is
not affected by the duration of the cycle per-se, it can be easily compared both across cycles
and across regions. And third, that the JRD does not differentiate between pronounced
and sustained output or job losses (although it could be modified to do so). Thus, in our
proposed measure, a business cycle with severe but short-lived job losses may yield the same
JRD than another cycle with mild but long-lived job losses.
Finally, it is also important to point out that the JRD measure is responsive to all the ele-
ments that define a jobless recovery in a non-controversial manner: a ceteris paribus increase
in the percentage of jobs lost during the cycle increases the JRD, a ceteris paribus increase
in the output growth experienced during the cycle increases the JRD, and a ceteris paribus
increase in the time it takes for the employment to recover also increases the JRD. These
responses show that our measure is consistent with the literature and the data regarding the
characteristics of past jobless recoveries in the U.S.
At the national level, the JRD measure can be easily calculated using the same BEA
data introduced before. In fact, one may deduct the national-level JRD values by measuring
the total area between the lines in figure 4, for each respective time period. For simplicity,
however, the corresponding national-level JRD values are plotted directly in figure 7. The
reason why the JRD measure takes both positive and negative values is simple. In any
given quarter, a negative value arises when the output loss is greater than the loss of of
employment. That is, when employment performs relatively better than output. Conversely,
positive values arise when employment has performed poorly relative to output, as one may
expect from the typical jobless recovery. Thus, since the JRD measure aggregates these
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Figure 7: This figure illustrates the jobless recovery depth measure using national data for the
USA. Output data used are real, seasonally-adjusted, quarterly GDP series from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). Employment data used are total non-farm employment series
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Seasonally adjusted series are provided monthly
by the BLS and are aggregated here to a quarterly frequency using the 3-month average.
As shown in figure 7, the JRD provides a clear answer to the question described in the
introduction about whether the jobless recovery of 2008 was more or less severe than that
of 2001. The JRD of 2008 is much greater than the JRD of 2001. Figure 7 also shows there
has been a marked increase in the JRD measure at the national level since 1990. In our
calculations, the largest JRD value for all pre-1990 recessions was .0179, while that for the
ongoing expansion is up to 25 times larger already (the JRD for the 2009 recession up to
quarter 4 of 2012 was .4561). Interestingly, when both the positive and negative values of
the JRD are considered, the increase in the JRD observed after the 1990’s seems to follow a
trend that starts some 20 years earlier. In fact, as illustrated in figure 7, national-level JRD
values have increased in every subsequent cycle since 1975. This observation then suggests
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that for the empirical study of the causes of jobless recoveries, it is important to secure data
dating back as many years as possible.
The JRD is not the only evidence that the relationship between output and employment
was changing well before 1991. Figure 8 shows the rolling correlation between the log dif-
ferences of GDP and employment from 1960 to 2012. This is a centered rolling correlation
with a window size of 8 years. From Figure 8 we see that the correlation between output and
employment has been declining since the 1970s. This provides further suggestive evidence
that there was in fact a change in the nature of the relationship between output growth and
employment growth well before the first observed jobless recovery in 1991. This suggests
that the JRD measure is uncovering something true about the co-movements of these two
variables throughout past business cycles, and that the trend observed in figure 7 is not a
aberration. However, it should also be noted that the rolling correlation is sensitive to the
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Rolling Correlation: GDP and Employment
Figure 8: Ablove: log difference of GDP and total nonfarm employment. Below: rolling correlation:
GDP and EMP. (window size of 8 years)
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4.4 Construction of the JRD at the State Level
Next, we wish to examine the cross-sectional properties of jobless recoveries. In order to do
that, we calculate JRD values at the state level for each of the NBER classified business
cycles on record since 1960. As explained before, the calculation of the JRD requires one
to define the business cycle peak dates (tbegin, tend) and calculate both, the employment and
output losses ((max{Lj}j∈(tbegin,t)−Lt) and (max{Yj}j∈(tbegin,t)−Yt), respectively), observed
during those periods. To define the state-level, business cycle peak dates (tbegin, tend), we
simply use the “peak to peak” intervals established by the NBER for the aggregate economy
as the common dates for all states. So that if tbegin = a and tend = b at the national level,
then we set tbegin = a and tend = b for all individual states. At first glance, this way of
choosing the business cycle dates for the individual states may seem problematic. At close
inspection, however, it is safe to say that states enter and exit business cycles in synchrony
with the national economy.
We compare the dates of the peaks and troughs for the nation provided by the NBER to
the state level output series we are using (earnings by place of work) in order to judge how
closely most state economies follow the national economy. We examine the 3 most recent
business cycles and find that 93% of the time, state troughs are within 2 quarters of the
national date, and 79% of the time, state peaks are within 2 quarters of the national date.
The more important number for the purposes of our study is the proximity of the troughs.
By design, our measure captures information in the recovery phase of the business cycle,
or immediately following the trough. State trough dates close to the national dates suggest
recoveries are beginning at similar times. Peak dates are important since we are defining our
business cycles as peak-to-peak intervals. However, in most cases, output and employment
series have already recovered to pre-recession levels well before the following peak, meaning
that the RJL measure is simply zero for several periods at the end of each cycle. Thus, even
if use of the national peak dates from the NBER causes our measure to omit 1, 2, or even
3 quarters (in extreme cases) of expansion, it is unlikely to change our measure much, if at
all. (92% of state peaks are within 4 quarters of the national date).
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Our further argument for using the national business cycle dates for the construction
of our state measures is that it is better than the alternative. Attempts to define unique
business cycles for each state create several problems. First, how does one choose to define a
cycle, and will this definition allow for comparison to the national definition? Is a recession
defined as two consecutive quarters of output decline? Such a definition does not even apply
to the national dates (see 2001). Using the national dates at the very least eliminates error
in attempting to fit all states into a single definition of how a business cycle is defined.
Importantly, sticking with the eight cycles from 1960-2012 for all states helps to maintain a
balanced panel. An arbitrary attempt at state-by-state business cycle dating may provide
seven cycles over our sample for one state, and nine for another, while an equally arbitrary
alternative measure may produce a completely different number of business cycles for each
state.
To construct the JRD for each state, we require output and employment data at a
quarterly frequency. This presents some challenges, especially with respect to the output
series, but suitable proxies are available as discussed in detail in section 3. Thus, we proceed
with our state-level JRD calculations using total nonfarm employment from the BLS for our
employment series and earnings by place of work as our output proxy.
Now that we have selected quarterly employment and output series for each state, we
construct the JRD for each state according to the same JRD equation used previously for the
national data. Given that we now possess a measure of a jobless recovery that is state specific,
we can examine several unique aspects of jobless recoveries which have not previously been
studied. Section 5 displays the state-level JRD data and further discusses the new insights
into jobless recoveries which can be gleaned from a cross-sectional examination of the data.
5 Cross-sectional properties of jobless recoveries
Although the phenomenon of jobless recoveries has been documented at the aggregate level
for the United States, it is also informative to consider the relationship between disaggre-
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gated jobs and output. By considering the variables of interest for several smaller groups, for
example, states, we are able to glean some additional information regarding the conditions
surrounding observed instances of jobless recoveries. Examination of the cross section allows
one to answer a wider range of questions regarding periods of prolonged joblessness in addi-
tion to an increased number of statistical tools for analyzing the data. One could examine
different kinds of groups other than U.S. states, such as regions, MSAs, counties, cities, or
even different industries using the same methodology to construct the measures presented
here. However, as a first attempt to study cross-sectional properties of jobless recoveries,
we will be focusing on state-level data. We encourage future research to study variations in
JRD using output and employment data at the industry and MSA levels.
It should first be noted that significant differences do and have existed across states
regarding the relationship between labor and output. Without these differences, a cross-
state study would be fruitless. However, we see that jobless recoveries vary a great deal from
place to place in duration, magnitude, etc. In fact, initial analysis of the data shows that
although jobless recoveries are fairly new in the aggregate, they have existed within certain
states in every post-war business cycle. Figure 9 plots our newly constructed measure, JRD,
for all 50 states for the last 8 business cycles. The data suggest that a considerable difference
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Figure 9: JRD for each state for each business cycle since 1960.
An alternative way to visually examine the cross-state differences in jobless recoveries is
presented in Figure 10. Here, shaded maps of the U.S. show the employment recovery gap
for each state over time, where a darker shade corresponds to a higher JRD, or a more severe
jobless recovery. Once again we see vast differences across both states and time. Recall the
previous discussion of how the JRD measure is able to take on both positive and negative
values. Just as we observed some business cycles with negative JRD values in the national
data, we observe several states with negative values at different points in time. This can
be observed in Figure 9. However, the maps of the United States in Figure 10 treats both
negative and zero values of JRD the same. This is due to the fact that both negative and
zero values correspond to cycles which had traditional, non-jobless, recoveries.
More specifically, the maps of the United States are shaded by assigning each state into
one of six categories. States are reassigned for each business cycle, and the category to which
a state is assigned is determined by the value of its JRD variable. The first category is by
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far the largest, and includes all states which have JRD values less than or equal to zero.
As discussed, a negative or zero value for JRD corresponds to a business cycle in which
employment performed relatively well compared to output. These business cycles are not
considered to experience any degree of a jobless recovery, and are placed into category 0,
which receives a white color, representing no degree of jobless recovery. The states which
have positive values of JRD are assigned to one of five categories according to the following
scale: category 1 for JRD values between (0, .125), category 2 for values between [0.125,
.25), category 3 for values between [.25, .50), category 4 for values between [.50, .75), and
category 5 for values between [.75, infinity). Each category is shaded in gray-scale where
darker states correspond to higher categories, or a higher degree of jobless recovery. The
shading for all six categories is depicted in the legend of Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Maps of all 50 U.S. states shaded according to their Jobless Recovery Depth
(JRD), with darker states having a higher JRD
38
It is also informative to inspect the distribution of state JRD values for each business
cycle. Histograms for all eight post-1960 business cycles are displayed in Figure 11. From the
histograms we see a fairly clear evolution over time. Nearly all of the business cycles prior
to 1991 saw very few or zero states with JRD values which were positive. The fast majority
of values were negative and close to zero. However, distributions are skewed somewhat
to the left, with some large negative-value outliers. Then, beginning in 1991, there is a
movement in the distribution to the right that has been increasing over each business cycle.
We see an increasing number of positive JRD values (jobless recoveries) and the distribution
even becomes skewed to the right. Finally, the most recent recovery, following the Great
Recession, shows a bimodal distribution with both peaks in the positive range.
One may also wish to examine the entire distribution over all eight cycles at once. This
is shown in Figure 12. Once again, we see large negative values from older business cycles
and positive values coming from more recent cycles. A look at the basic summary statistics
of the state-level JRD in Table 1 points to the same pattern. All of this evidence suggests
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Figure 11: Histograms for the distribution of state JRD values over each business cycle since









-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
T_1961Q1 Histogram T_1970Q4 Histogram
T_1975Q1 Histogram T_1980Q3 Histogram
T_1982Q4 Histogram T_1991Q1 Histogram









Figure 12: Single histogram of all JRD values for all states over all eight business cycles.
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Table 1: JRD Summary Statistics. Basic summary statistics for the state-level JRD measures,
covering the years 1960-2012. Column one shows statistics for the average business cycles before
1990. In turn, column 2 shows statistics for the cycle that begun in the third quarter of 1990,
column 3 for the cycle that begun in the first quarter of 2001, and column three for the cycle that
begun in the fourth quarter of 2007
JRD Pre-1990 average 1991 2001 2009
Mean -0.196 0.007 0.099 0.078
Median -0.010 -0.011 0.048 0.082
Standard Dev. 0.724 0.289 0.1732 0.254
Minimum -7.700 -0.957 -0.285 -0.557
Maximum 0.420 0.849 0.570 0.518
Sample size 250 50 50 50
6 Concluding Remarks
We have taken initial steps to address two major limitations that have existed to date in
the jobless recovery literature; a lack of meaningful measures capable of generating positive
statements about jobless recoveries, and a lack of studies considering cross-sectional evidence.
We demonstrate how current methods of measuring and analyzing jobless recoveries fail to
capture the multi-dimensional characteristics of these events such as relative depth and
duration. We propose a measure which incorporates all of these dimensions into a single
index which we have named the Jobless Recovery Depth (JRD). This measure possesses
important properties which allow it to capture the essential information present during a
jobless period. Upon defining this measure, we proceeded to construct a database for the
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JRD index for each state since 1960. This database was made publicly available 10 for use
in future research and will be updated regularly by the authors. The ability to perform
cross-sectional and panel analysis using a multi-dimensional measure of jobless recoveries
will greatly assist the empirical testing of the existing and forthcoming hypotheses on the
causes of jobless recoveries in the United States.
From inspection of the JRD measure, we are able to make several observations in answer
to questions which have previously not been answered. At the national level, our measure
is consistent with the consensus in the literature that the jobless recovery problem began in
1991. However, it also suggests that the magnitude of the jobless recovery problem is mono-
tonically increasing in the U.S. since approximately 1975. This has important implications
for future work in this area, suggesting candidate explanations for this phenomenon should
be consistent these newly uncovered facts as well. Also, our measure implies that if current
trends continue, we can expect an even more severe episode of joblessness in the recovery
phase of the next U.S. business cycle. If such a trend continues, it may have major implica-
tions regarding the ability of classical macroeconomic policy to satisfy its dual objectives of
output and employment growth.
Furthermore, we find that jobless recoveries have existed in the United States prior
to 1991, at least at the state level, which fact has not previously been explored. More
specifically, jobless recoveries have existed in at least some states for every business cycle
since 1960. We find that although jobless recoveries are observed in the national data, they
are not a nation-wide problem. Several states fail to experience jobless recoveries at all,
and the extent of the problem in each state varies widely. The large differences which are
observed across states and across time suggests that future cross-sectional research of jobless
recoveries at the state-level is promising.
10The JRD state-level database and accompanying code are available on Dr. Fabio
Mendez’s website, http://evergreen.loyola.edu/fmendez1/www/
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B Continuous counterparts to JL, OL, and RJL
Let JLAt = Lt − max[Lt−j−1]j≥0. Here, JLA stands for ”Job Loss - alternate” where the
alternate measure is a continuous counterpart to the JL measure presented in the body of
the paper that reported zeros for many observations. JLA presents two changes from JL.
First, we have flipped the order around so that the historical maximum value is now being
subtracted from the current value. This generates jobless spikes in a downward direction
rather than an upward direction. Secondly, the historical maximum is restricted to the
period before the current period. This way, even if the current period is indeed the historical
max, it will not be subtracted from itself and we will not get observations with a value of
zero. We use an identical specification to construct a continuous measure for output which
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Figure 13: Job Loss - alternate and Output Loss - alternate, continuous measures similar to
the discontinous Job Loss and Output Loss which were presented in the body of the paper.
Now that we have continuous measure for Job Loss and Output Loss, we can construct
a measure for the Relative Job Loss that is also continuous. Let RJLA = JLA(t)-OLA(t),
where RJLA stands for ”Relative Job Loss - alternate.” We have now constructed a measure
for the relative degree of joblessness for any period between 1960 and 2012 that is continuous.
RJLA can be found in Figure 14. These measures may be used in future statistical analysis
desiring a quarterly measure of relative joblessness without the issue of so many observations
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Figure 14: The continuous measure for the Relative Job Loss (RJLA)
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Chapter 2: The Causes of Jobless Recoveries: Cross-sectional Evidence from
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Abstract
It has now been well documented that the three most recent business cycles have been
accompanied by jobless recoveries. The literature on this topic presents many competing
theories as to the cause of this problem. We carefully review the literature to determine
what the proposed causes of the jobless recovery problem are. We then perform a cross-
sectional analysis of these theories using the newly constructed state-level jobless recovery
measure, the “jobless recovery depth”. In what is the first statistical test of several of these
hypotheses, we find the state-level evidence to be consistent with theories that link jobless
recoveries to changes in union power, labor hoarding behavior, and the advent of the great




Up until about 1991, business-cycle expansions in the post-war USA came together with
almost simultaneous increases in employment. However, this macroeconomic relationship
seems to have changed following the recession of 1991, and in all of the economic recoveries
observed after that date, output growth has been accompanied by extended periods of con-
tinued job losses. Such periods of positive output growth accompanied by zero employment
growth have been labeled “jobless recoveries” and are the subject of a recent literature that
attempts to understand their emergence.
There have been many competing explanations put forth following the seminal paper of
Groshen and Potter (2003). The proposed causes of the jobless recovery phenomenon range
from declining union power (Berger, 2012), to increasing health care costs (Aaronson, et al,
2004a; Wessel, 2004), to the relocation of labor across industries (Groshen and Potter, 2003;
Garin, et al., 2011), along with at least a dozen others. Although the existence of jobless
recoveries has been well established in this literature, there has been little to no movement
towards establishing a consensus regarding the cause(s) of this recent change. Although
there are many separate theories, there has been very little empirical work done in the area
of jobless recoveries and almost no formal statistical testing of these hypotheses.
The lack of econometric work in this field has clearly lagged behind the theory. Our ability
to test the many competing hypothesis has been constrained by two important limitations:
1. The lack of comprehensive measures capable of quantifying the extent or severity of a
jobless recovery; which hinders our ability to generate positive statements and compare across
business cycles. 2. The lack of cross-sectional statistical analysis at the state or regional
level; which prevents us from conducting tests that cannot be performed using time-series
data alone.
With the formation of the Jobless Recovery Depth (JRD) measure in Chapter 1 of this
dissertation, the first constraint has been eliminated. This paper is concerned with the
second constraint: the lack of cross-sectional statistical analysis. In this paper, we discuss
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the many different proposed causes of jobless recoveries in the literature, and then seek to
create variables using state-level data that will allow us to test these hypotheses. Using
these as explanatory variables, and the newly computed state-level JRD as our dependent
variable, we conduct a cross-sectional study of jobless recoveries which puts several of the
existing hypothesis to the test. In some cases, the lack of state-level data prevents us from
being able to formally test these hypotheses. We discuss the availability of state-level data
and the set of usable explanatory variables in this paper. As far as we are aware, this is the
first attempt to study the jobless recovery problem at the state level.
We conduct a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed-effects, and random-effects
regressions in which our state-level JRD measure is entered as the dependent variable and a
series explanatory variables for which we are able to obtain data are entered as independent
variables. Through these regressions, we find evidence in support of arguments that link
jobless recoveries to declines in union membership, unusually lengthy expansionary periods
between cycles, and reduced output volatility. In contrast, our findings fail to find a robust
correlation between jobless recoveries and either income inequality or health care costs1.
The analysis performed in this paper is an important first step towards narrowing down
the large pool of candidate explanations of jobless recoveries. As we show, there are many
proposed explanations in the literature to date, but the lack of empirical work means we
have been unable to reject any of these hypotheses previously. Our analysis, although not
completely comprehensive, finds support for some of these theories, while helping to eliminate
some of the others. Future research must continue to test the remaining theories on the causes
of jobless recoveries in order to focus in on the true cause(s).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an extensive review
of the literature on the causes of jobless recoveries, Section 3 discusses those independent
variables for which state-level data is available and reviews the properties of the dependent
variable, the JRD, Section 4 discusses the state-level data used for construction of the ex-
1A series of regressions with a smaller sample size also failed to find evidence to support
theories of labor relocation and household mobility.
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planatory variables, Section 5 presents our cross-sectional analysis of the likely causes of
jobless recoveries, and, finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Survey of the Literature on Jobless Recoveries
If anything can be said from a review of the literature on jobless recoveries, it is that there
is clearly no consensus as to the cause. While a handful of candidate explanations have
received more attention than others, no clear front runner has emerged. Given the lack of
empirical testing to date, one cannot ignore any of the previously proposed explanations
of the jobless recovery problem. In this section, we set out to introduce the reader to the
wide range of theories which have been put forth in the literature and which cannot yet
be rejected. Table 1 provides a concise summary of the different proposed causes of jobless
recoveries and the supporting research. The remainder of the section examines each theory
in slightly more depth. However, the empirical analysis in this paper deals only with those
theories for which state-level data is available. Readers who are solely interested in the data
used for the empirical analysis and the results may wish to skip over this section, or simply
review Table 1.
In the most widely cited paper on jobless recoveries, Groshen and Potter (2003) examine
how structural change, which they define as the permanent shifts in the distribution of
workers throughout the economy, helps to explain why job growth stalled during the recovery
beginning in 2001. The first type of structural change they consider is the prevalence of
permanent job losses in place of temporary job losses. In the case of a temporary layoff,
both the employer and employee expect the relationship to resume when demand increases.
In some instances, the employer may even help the employee file for unemployment benefits
so that they will be able to wait until demand increases and return to their old job. A
permanent layoff however completely breaks the tie between employer and employee. This
requires that both parties must expend a great deal more effort to find a new employee or
a new job. Groshen and Potter find that pre-1990, temporary layoffs spiked significantly
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Table 1: Summary of the Literature. A summary of the proposed causes of jobless
recoveries with supporting research papers.
Proposed Causes Authors
Increased repositioning of jobs Groshen and Potter (2003)
across industries Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004b)
Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010)
Increased repositioning of jobs Schultze (2004)
across regions Garin, Pries, and Sims (2011)
Blanchflower and Oswalt (2013)
Increasing length of economic Koenders and Rogerson (2005)
expansions Bachmann (2011)
Berger (2012)
Declining output volatility Faberman (2008)
(Great Moderation) Engemann and Owyang (2010)
Garin, Pries, and Sims (2011)
DeNicco and Laincz (2013)
Increasing health care costs Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004a)
Wessel (2004)
Declining union power Berger (2012)
Rising income inequality Cynamon and Fazzari (2014)
Krugman (2014)
Increase use of just-in-time Schreft and Singh (2003)
employment Bachmann (2011)
Panovska (2013)
Increase in permanent layoffs Groshen and Potter (2003)
Garin, Pries, and Sims (2011)
Greater job polarization Jaimovich and Siu (2012)
Inadequate aggregate demand Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004a)
Inadequate labor supply Schweitzer (2003)
Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004a)
Increasing real wage rigidity Shimer (2010)
Increasing average labor Gali and van Rens (2010)
productivity Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010)
Credit market shocks Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello (2012)
Short and shallow recessions Bachmann (2011)
Slow diffusion of new technology Andolfatto and MacDonald (2006)
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with each recession, but that this was not the case in either of the recessions after 1990,
suggesting there may have been a structural change in how firms lay off employees. Garin,
Pries, and Sims (2011) also note the correlation between jobless recoveries and increases in
temporary layoffs.
Groshen and Potter (2003) considered another form of structural change as well: the
repositioning of jobs from one industry to another. For their analysis, they examined how
jobs adjusted in each of the major U.S. industries during the business cycle. If job losses
or gains within a given industry during a recession are quickly reversed when the economy
recovers, then these employment changes are considered to be cyclical. Likewise, if jobs con-
tinue to grow or decrease within in industry well into the recovery, then these changes are
considered structural. They find that structural change in jobs moving from some industries
to others was significantly more important in the post-1990 recoveries. Elsby, Hobijn, and
Sahin (2010) also discuss structural change across industries, however, they find that unem-
ployment outflows are actually converging across U.S. industries, not diverging, contrary to
the hypothesis of Groshen and Potter. This explanation of jobless recoveries is examined
yet again by Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004b), who find no evidence to support
Groshen and Potter’s claim, using different method to measure sectoral reallocation.
Schreft and Singh (2003) look at how specific hiring patterns in the U.S. have changed
over time and how these changes distinguish the recent jobless recoveries from the typical
recoveries of the past. They find that in the recent jobless recoveries that firms have come
to rely more heavily on just-in-time employment practices. That is, firms are substituting
more flexible labor inputs such as overtime and temporary and part-time workers, in place of
less flexible labor inputs. Schreft and Singh reach this conclusion by comparing employment
growth during the recovery phase following the recessions of the early 1990’s and early 2000’s
to the average of past business cycles from 1960 to 1989. They find that at least the first
year of both post-1990 recoveries were indeed jobless, and accompanied by a significant
increase in the use of just-in-time employment methods, which had not been seen in the
typical recovery. Finally, they argue that the use of such employment practices gives the
58
firm greater flexibility in employing labor. Firms can therefore expand production given
short notice to meet anticipated increases in demand but are still able to wait for indications
that this escalation in demand will be sustained. Although they note this correlation, Schreft
and Singh provide no clear reason as to why these just-in-time employment techniques are
such a recent development. Using data for hours worked in place of employment, they also
show that the jobless recoveries in the U.S. have been “hourless” recoveries as well.
This finding is at odds with the finding of Panovska (2013) who finds that hours have
seen a significant increase during the recent periods of jobless recovery. Panovska argues that
firms have substituted away form adding new workers and have simply caused their existing
employees to work longer hours. Bachmann (2011), also argues that firms with increase
hours worked and not employees when the economic recovery is a fairly weak one.
Berger (2012) presents a quantitative model where firms are able to restructure during
recessions. This model includes worker heterogeneity, endogenous entry and exit, labor
adjustment costs and aggregate shocks. Unlike previous models in this area, Berger’s model
is able to explain both the joblessness of recoveries and the recent countercyclicality of labor
productivity to the business cycle, while still being a good fit for the entire post-war period.
Berger argues that one major cause of the structural change observed in the 1980s is the
significant decline in union power, which allowed firms to fire employees more selectively.
Specifically, he presents cross-state and cross-industry tests of how output and productivity
were affected by decreasing union coverage, while ignoring the issue of how joblessness may
be related to union power. Berger performs a cross-state statistical test of the relationship
between declining union coverage rates and the correlation of output and labor productivity.
However, he does not extend his statistical analysis of the union power hypothesis to the
question of jobless recoveries, only to the question of the recent countercyclicality of labor
productivity.
Garin, Pries, and Sims (2011) argue that jobless recoveries are just one of several im-
portant changes in the nature of economic fluctuations in recent years. They point to four
other important facts about the economy that have arisen along with jobless recoveries: de-
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creased output volatility (the Great Moderation), labor productivity becoming acyclical, a
decline in the importance of the “efficiency wedge” relative to the “labor wedge”, and the
dramatic decline in temporary layoffs over the last three recessions. The authors contend
that these changes are all related in some way and call for a common explanation. The main
hypothesis of the paper is that reallocative shocks now play a more important role in the
economy relative to aggregate shocks. They argue that the relocation of labor across regions
and industries will take time, and employment will recover more slowly than before. How-
ever, others (Schultze, 2004; Blanchflower and Oswalt, 2005) have argued that it is actually
decreases in labor mobility (relocation) that have contributed to jobless recoveries.
The correlation between the Great Moderation and jobless recoveries was one noted not
only by Garin, Pries, and Sims (2011), but by several others as well. Faberman (2008)
performs structural break tests for job flows in and out of the market, looking for a break
in the year 1984, the year commonly associated with the start of the Great Moderation.
Engemann and Owyang (2010) and DeNicco and Laincz (2013) also argue that the decline
in output volatility may have caused the subsequent jobless recoveries.
Koenders and Rogerson (2005) and Bachmann (2011) put forth a new explanation for
the jobless recovery phenomenon that focuses on dynamics within growing organizations
and the inter-temporal substitution of organizational restructuring. Their analysis implies
that slower employment growth following a recession is a characteristic of unusually long
expansions. Longer expansions lead to more labor hoarding on the part of firms and a
greater need to restructure following economic downturn. Firms will wait until recessions,
when the cost is relatively low, to shed their less productive workers. This provides the firm
with a period, during recovery, where only the productive employees remain following the
restructuring and there is little to no need to add more labor to meet increases in demand.
Gali and van Rens (2010) also seek to explain multiple changes in business cycle phe-
nomena with a single model. They hypothesize that increases in labor market productivity
are driving the acyclicality of labor productivity and the increased volatility of employ-
ment. Lower costs of adjustment lead to less labor hoarding, producing more acyclical labor
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productivity. However, this explanation is not consistent with the recent business cycle phe-
nomenon of jobless recoveries. Lower labor adjustment costs cannot explain both of these
facts simultaneously. Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010) also point out the correlation between
jobless recoveries and increased average labor productivity. However, whether increased la-
bor productivity is a potential cause of jobless recoveries or a product of jobless recoveries
has not been established.
Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004a) point out that increases in productivity alone do
not explain why jobs are not being added to the economy. Rather, the fact that productivity
increases have not been accompanied by proportional gains in aggregate demand is the real
issue as it applies to the jobs market. The authors suggest that a series of shocks following
the recessions of 1990 and 2000 may have led to unusually slow AD growth. Possible shocks
responsible for this include: concerns over terrorism, hangover from the fall in the stock
market, the credit crunch resulting from the savings and loan crisis, and revelations of poor
corporate governance.
While several other theories have focused on factors affecting labor demand (just-in-time
employment, health care costs, etc.), Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004a) point out
that changes in labor supply are another potential explanation. They consider labor force
participation rates as a proxy for labor supply and show that the recent jobless recoveries
have experienced considerably lower labor force participation rates than previous recoveries.
This finding is consistent with the work of Schweitzer (2003). However, Aaronson, et al. are
quick to mention that labor force participation rates may be a poor proxy for labor supply
as they may reflect the expectation of finding a job, not the willingness to work.
Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello (2012) consider how shocks to the credit market may
result in a sluggish labor market leading to the recent jobless recoveries. They find that
the labor market adjusts much more slowly in recessions where the primary driving force
is a disruption in the credit market, as opposed to the recessions not brought on by credit
market shocks. In their model, recessions induced by credit market shocks can either result
in a jobless recovery or in persistently low real wages, depending upon the pattern of inflation
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during the recession. They find that high inflation is correlated with low real wages during
a recovery, while low inflation is correlated with joblessness during a recovery.
Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004a) and Wessel (2004) present two arguments as to
why increases in health care costs could possibly be responsible for jobless recoveries. The
first is that higher health care costs have pushed the total cost of labor above equilibrium,
reducing labor demand. The second argument suggests that any increase in fixed costs per
worker, which do not vary with hours worked or base salary, is likely to have an adverse
effect on the hiring of new employees. Data on health care costs show increases over the
time period associated with jobless recoveries.
Jaimovich and Siu (2012) argue that jobless recoveries are correlated with increasing
job polarization. Job polarization is a term that refers to the disappearance of jobs in the
middle of the skill distribution. The majority of the decline in middle-skill occupations occurs
during times of economic downturn. They conclude that jobless recoveries in middle-skill
occupations account for jobless recoveries in the aggregate. This is supported by the fact
that recoveries are not jobless in high-skill or low-skill occupations. Also, job polarization
was not present in the economy prior to the age of jobless recoveries.
Shimer (2010) examines how jobless recoveries can be generated by real wage rigidities.
He shows that in a neoclassical growth model, following a shock, if wages are permitted to
be flexible then they will fall as the economy grows back to trend. On the other hand, if
wages are perfectly inflexible, or rigid, then the shock will result in a permanent decline in
employment and output relative to trend. Extending the neoclassical model to allow for
firms to recruit more labor, a search model, Shimer shows that even under the condition of
rigid wages, the effects of the shock will eventually disappear. It should be noted that the
data for the recovery period following the Great Recession was very limited at the time this
paper was written, as it included data only up through the second quarter of 2010. Also,
the model in the paper captures the declines in both employment and output, yet it says
little about their divergent behavior of the two during the recovery phase, which is really
the heart of the jobless recovery problem. Also, the paper only presents data beginning in
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1990. Rather than address the causes of jobless recoveries, the paper seems to focus more
on the recession phase of the past three business cycles, while the recovery phase has been
identified as the period of interest in the literature.
Andolfatto and MacDonald (2006) argue that jobless recoveries are in fact the exact
prediction of neoclassical theory under conditions of new technologies unevenly impacting
different sectors of the economy and being slow to diffuse. It is their contention that jobless
recoveries are the result of many different types of shocks and mechanisms that are all
interacting at a given moment in time. However, they contend that technology shocks are a
primary driving force. They set up a RBC model where GDP growth is driven by advances
in technology that raise total factor productivity, however this technology does not affect
the entire economy evenly nor instantaneously. This model yields labor and income results
that are quantitatively similar to those observed during the recent jobless recoveries.
Bachmann (2011) investigates the jobless recoveries after the 1991 and 2001 recessions.
While the majority of explanations have been based on the concept of structural change in
the economy, Bachmann focuses on how a cyclical mechanism has contributed to the genera-
tion of these jobless recoveries. He builds upon the previous work of Hansen and Sargent and
computes a DSGE model of heterogeneous establishments that use both an intensive margin
(hours worked) and an extensive margin (employment) of labor services. When establish-
ments face adjustment costs to employment, then following a short and shallow recession
the need to hire new employees is relatively weak. Also, the model shows that firms will
increase average hours per worker in the earlier portion of a weak recovery, delaying new
hires. Bachmann concludes that this is a fairly good fit to the U.S. data. However, although
the paper has been updated as recently as 2011, it does not include any data for the Great
Recession, which may present some problems given that this recession was neither short nor
shallow and yet a jobless recovery still ensued.
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3 State-Level Variables
In this section, we will discuss the construction of both dependent and independent variables
at the state level. First, we review the properties of our dependent variable, the “jobless
recovery depth” (JRD), and discuss its usefulness in a cross-sectional study such as this.
We then discuss which of the aforementioned candidate causes of jobless recoveries has the
necessary data available at the state level for the construction of an explanatory variable. As
we will see, the state-level data is somewhat limiting, and not all of the theories that have
been presented in the literature can be tested in a cross-state analysis. However, several of
the leading explanations can be tested. For those potential causes where data does exist, we
will provide a slightly deeper review of the literature in order to understand what the theory
tells us concerning the expected direction of each variable’s effect on the magnitude of a
jobless recovery. We also discuss the sources of all state-level data, and any manipulations
made to the data prior to the econometric analysis.
3.1 Dependent Variable
Recall from Chapter 1 of this dissertation, that one of the ways in which empirical work
in the area of jobless recoveries has been constrained is that no meaningful measure of the
magnitude of a jobless recovery has been created. However, this constraint was eliminated
with the introduction of the JRD measure in Chapter 12. The JRD has several important
properties that make it a strong variable for gauging the multiple aspects of jobless recov-
eries. Specifically, a ceteris paribus increase in the percentage of jobs lost during the cycle
increases the JRD, a ceteris paribus increase in the output growth experienced during the
cycle increases the JRD, and a ceteris paribus increase in the time it takes for the employ-
ment to recover also increases the JRD. These responses show that our measure is consistent
with the literature and the data regarding the characteristics of past jobless recoveries in the
2Descriptions of the what the JRD is, how it was constructed at the state level, and the
state-level data used are all laid out in full in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. Please refer
back to Chapter 1 to answer any questions regarding the JRD measure.
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U.S.
Table 2: JRD Summary Statistics. Basic summary statistics for the state-level JRD
measures, covering the years 1960-2012. Column one shows statistics for the average business
cycles before 1990. In turn, column 2 shows statistics for the cycle that begun in the third
quarter of 1990, column 3 for the cycle that begun in the first quarter of 2001, and column
three for the cycle that begun in the fourth quarter of 2007
JRD Pre-1990 average 1991 2001 2009
Mean -0.196 0.007 0.099 0.078
Median -0.010 -0.011 0.048 0.082
Standard Dev. 0.724 0.289 0.1732 0.254
Minimum -7.700 -0.957 -0.285 -0.557
Maximum 0.420 0.849 0.570 0.518
Sample size 250 50 50 50
It is also important to note that there is a great deal of variation across states and time
in the severity of jobless recoveries as measured by the JRD. If not for this variation, a cross-
state study such as this would be fruitless. However, we see that there are truly dramatic
differences across time and space. Table 2 shows basic summary statistics for the JRD
variable for all 50 states. Similar to what has been previously shown in the national data,
jobless recoveries appear to be growing worse over time. Also, the range of JRD values, and
their standard deviation, indicate that states have experienced joblessness very differently
from one another over time.
This is further evidenced by inspecting the maps in Figure 1. Here, each state is shaded
according to its JRD value, where a darker shade indicates a more severe period of jobless-
ness. From these maps, we see that jobless recoveries are not a nation-wide phenomenon,
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but rather a somewhat localized event, occurring in certain states, often clustered around
one another. This observation is completely lost using the national data alone. However, it
is also clear that many of the states exhibiting jobless recoveries in Figure 1 are experiencing
fairly mild instances of joblessness. Several fall into the lowest category and are shaded
with the lightest shade of gray. In order to show that jobless recoveries truly are somewhat
localized events, we do a robustness check by eliminating all of the “mild” jobless recoveries
from the map. In other words, we do not want our findings to be watered down by including
several states that experience only mild instances of joblessness, so we replace the lowest
shade of gray with white in Figure 2. Even when we eliminate the most mild instances of
jobless recoveries, we still see a great deal of variation across time and state, with jobless
recoveries clustered in certain regions.
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Figure 1: Maps of all 50 U.S. states shaded according to their JRD, with darker states having
a higher JRD
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Although we would like to test each of the theories on the causes of jobless recoveries, the
availability of data at the state level constrains our analysis. In this section, we discuss those
candidate explanations for which state-level data does exist. We then further discuss the
existing research involving those theories for which we have data, in order to determine the
expected direction of the effect each will have on our measure for the severity of a jobless
recovery, the JRD. We summarize the theoretical arguments built around each candidate
cause separately, but the description of the data we collected in order to test them is provided
in the next section.
One of the proposed causes of a jobless recovery for which state-level data is available is
the decline in union power. According to Berger (2012), declining union power across the U.S.
has been the major contributing factor to the jobless recovery phenomenon. His argument is
based upon the restrictions faced by firms when firing their employees. As unions lose power,
firms are able to be more selective in their firing decisions, allowing them to keep employees
based on factors such as performance and not seniority. Then, when the economy recovers
and demand increases, firms already have employees which are a good match, eliminating
some of the incentive to hire new employees. This differs from times when unions are more
powerful, and senior employees often keep their jobs even if they aren’t the most productive.
In this case, firms have an incentive to hire high-productivity individuals during periods of
economic recovery to compensate for their long-tenured workforce that may not be entirely
productive. The resulting hypothesis is that as union power decreases, the magnitude of the
jobless recovery increases.
Koenders and Rogerson (2005), Bachmann (2011), and Berger (2012) argue that the
length of an expansionary period leading up to a recession affects the degree to which jobs lag
output when the recovery begins. Koenders and Rogerson argue that certain inefficiencies
regarding labor build up in an organization over time. Since restructuring labor requires
a diversion of resources away from current production, firms lack an incentive to do so
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until times of economic decline when the opportunity cost of restructuring is relatively low.
Longer periods of economic expansion would therefore be expected to generate greater labor
inefficiencies. This will result in a significant number of jobs being shed during the recession
with little reason for newly streamlined firms to add back inefficient labor. The hypothesis
which is generated from this argument is that the longer the preceding period of economic
expansion, the more severe the jobless recovery.
To test whether the decline in union power or the length of the expansionary periods that
precedes a cycle can in fact explain the emergence of jobless recoveries, we collected data on
three related variables: the state-specific length of expansion, the states’ union membership
rate, and the states’ forced unionism legislation3. To construct our length of expansion
variable, we simply utilize the seasonally-adjusted, real earnings data and count the number
of quarters of expansion in output that take place prior to the beginning of each cycle. That
is, we count the number of quarters in the previous cycle for which output exhibited positive
growth.
In order to construct the union membership variable, in turn, we utilized union mem-
bership rates for each state from Hirsh et al. (2001). They combine data from the BLS
Current Population Survey and the Directory of National Unions and Employee Associa-
tions and estimate the percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary employees who are
union members, including in the public sector, from 1964 to 2012. The data is reported on
an annual basis but for the purposes of our study, a cycle-specific measure is required. We
then used the average fraction of non-farm employees covered under a collective bargaining
agreement during the entire cycle as the relevant measure of union membership. Finally, to
construct the forced unionism variable, we created a dummy variable using data from the
national right to work legal defense foundation. For each particular state and cycle, this
dummy equals 1 if force-unionism legislation is in place at the beginning of the cycle and
3Some states have adopted legislation which allows employees the “right to work” for
a firm with a unionized labor force, without having to pay union fees. This is known as
right-to-work law and is believed to decrease a union’s power as it can no longer force those
covered under the collective bargaining agreement to pay their membership dues. States
which have not adopted such legislation are referred to as “forced unionism” states.
70
zero otherwise.
Another one of the candidate causes we are able to study at the state level is the advent
of a much documented decrease in the volatility of aggregate economic variables; a shift
known as the “great moderation”. Authors like Engemann and Owyang (2010), Faberman
(2008), and DeNicco and Laincz (2013) have presented convincing evidence showing the
emergence of jobless recoveries at the aggregate level coincides with the beginning of the
great moderation. Despite the evidence they provide, however, very few explanations can
be found in the literature as to why this could be the case. The only exception that we are
aware of is the paper by Garin, Pries and Sims (2011). We will test the hypothesis that
lower output volatility will increase the magnitude of a jobless recovery.
Garin, Pries and Sims (2011) use a labor reallocation model and show that a decline in the
importance of aggregate shocks relative to re-allocative shocks can simultaneously account
for both the jobless recoveries and the great moderation. In their model, re-allocative shocks
precipitate the relocation of workers “across sectors, professions, or geographic regions” and,
since displaced workers are more likely to experience lengthier unemployment spells and
steeper learning curves for their subsequent occupations, the relocation process may lead
to a jobless recovery. The explanation put forth by Garin, Pries and Sims 2011 is justified
by the evidence presented in Foerster et al (2011); which shows re-allocative shocks have
indeed become relatively more important than aggregate shocks. But it is at odds with an
empirical literature which fails to find a direct link between the relocation of workers and
jobless recoveries. In one of the earlier studies, Groshen and Potter (2003) presented evidence
suggesting job relocations across industries may be responsible for jobless recoveries. Later
studies by Aaronson et al (2004a), Aaronson et al. (2004b), and Panovska (2013), however,
have failed to support that hypothesis. Others like Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) actually
suggest that greater labor mobility is positively correlated with employment.
We would like to test whether the correlation found at the aggregate level between jobless
recoveries and the great moderation, can also be found at the state-level. For that purpose,
we construct a state-level measure of output volatility for the cycle. More specifically, we
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compute the absolute values of the first-differences in the quarterly growth rates of earnings
(a measure roughly equivalent to one of the measures of volatility used by McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000) using U.S. GDP data, in their seminal paper that documents the Great
Moderation) and take the average of these values over the entire cycle as our measure of
volatility. The smaller the volatility, the greater the moderation. Unfortunately, we were
unable to obtain adequate state-level data documenting neither the extent nor the type of
workers’ relocations, so a deeper test of the arguments put forth by Garin, Pries and Sims
(2011) was not possible. In the appendix at the end of the paper we present an attempt to
fill that gap using what limited state-level data is available.4
Finally, the last two theories which we are able to test with state-level data are the
rise in health care costs and the increase in income inequality that have taken place in the
USA in recent decades as candidate causes of jobless recoveries. Aaronson, et al. (2004)
and Wessel (2004) argue that rapidly increasing health care costs have played an important
role in firms being reluctant to add new employees. Specifically, increases in health care
costs can be reflected as increases in fixed costs per worker, regardless of salary level or the
number of hours worked. This provides an incentive for firms to squeeze as much work as
possible out of their existing employees, for example through working longer hours, and to
hire part-time and temporary employees who are not going to incur these fixed costs for the
firm. Importantly, higher health care costs, as argued here, could lead to firms relying more
heavily on just-in-time employment practices as stated by Schreft and Singh (2003). State-
level data on part-time and temporary employment do not appear to exist for the sample
period of our study, but health care cost data does exist over a significant portion of that
period. If health care costs are driving both jobless recoveries and just-in-time employment,
this helps to fill the hole left by not having the just-in-time employment data. From these
arguments, the expectation is that greater increases in health care costs will result in greater
jobless recoveries, and more income inequality will result in greater jobless recoveries. While
4As shown in Table 8 in the Appendix, in the reduced-sample regressions, the estimated
coefficients for the homeownership and relocation variables are always insignificant. Thus,
our results suggests that relocation and household mobility do not significantly explain vari-
ations in the magnitude of jobless recoveries.
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Cynamon and Fazzari (2014) and Krugman (2014) argue that jobless recoveries are at least
partially due to the drag in demand that is generated by the rising inequality of income. We
are not aware, however, of any papers that formally test these arguments.
We attempt to quantify the burden imposed on firms by health care costs at the state
level, by utilizing data provided by the Office of the Actuary of the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid services (CMS). The CMS estimates Health Care expenditure by State of Provider
for each state. The CMS reports the sum of total revenues generated by all health-care
related industries. These estimates are reported annually from 1980-2009 (so they constrain
our sample a little) and are not adjusted for inflation. We use the GDP deflator to calculate
real, per-capita health care expenditures for each state, and then take the annual average
over each cycle. In turn, in order to track changes in income inequality at the state level, we
borrow data from Frank (2008) and record the corresponding Gini coefficients for each state
at the start of each cycle. Frank (2008) constructs Gini coefficients using adjusted gross
income from the IRS’s Statistics of Income publication.
To summarize, the set of explanatory variables representing our list of “candidate causes”
for which we have state-level data, includes measures of union membership, forced-unionism,
output volatility, length of preceding expansion, income inequality, and health-care costs5.
We were able to gather data going back to 1960 for almost all variables, with some exceptions.
For the length of expansion variable, for example, since our data does not go beyond 1960,
we are unable to compute this number for the cycle that begins in 1960 and we are forced
to work with a reduced sample whenever the length of expansion variable is included. A
similar problem occurred with the health-care costs. Summary statistics for all explanatory
variables are displayed in Table 3; ordered according to the number of observations we were
able to obtain. Health care costs are reported in thousands of dollars throughout the paper.
5Relocation and household mobility variables were available, but only over a smaller range
and are analyzed in the Appendix
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Table 3: Additional Summary Statistics. Basic summary statistics for the explanatory
variables for all cycles considered
Variable n Mean S.d. Min Max
UNION MEMBERSHIP 400 18.18 8.85 3.10 42.10
FORCED UNIONISM 400 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
VOLATILITY 400 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.98
INCOME INEQUALITY 400 0.52 0.06 0.41 0.70
LENGTH OF EXPANSION 350 20.89 10.88 1.00 41.00
HEALTH CARE COSTS (1=$1000) 250 4.36 1.91 1.5 9.45
4 Data Description
One unique aspect of our empirical analysis is the use of business cycle-specific variables.
That is, we use a simple value to represent the entire business cycle. The JRD is a cycle-
specific measure by definition; it sums the difference between output losses and employment
losses over the entire cycle. Since the JRD is our dependent variable, we need independent
variables that are cycle-specific as well. Although we have already mentioned where most of
the data comes from for the construction of these variables, it is important to understand
exactly how each cycle-specific independent variable was constructed. This section explains
all the relevant details of the data including where is came from, what adjustments were
made, and how this data was then turned into a cycle-specific measure for use in our analysis.6
As a measure of union power, union membership rates for each state are taken from
BLS’s Current Population Survey, and the Directory of National Unions and Employee As-
sociations, combined and reported by Barry Hisch and David Macpherson at unionstats.com.
This database provides union membership density from 1964-2012. This data is reported on
an annual basis and represents the percentage of non-farm employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. However, to match this measure of union power appropriately with
6A description of the data for our relocation and household mobility variables is found in
the Appendix.
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the number of time periods of our jobless recovery measure, we need only one value for each
business cycle. We break the sample into the 8 business cycles identified by the NBER from
1960-2012 and take the average union membership density over the cycle. Thus, our measure
of union power is the within-cycle average percentage of non-farm employees covered under
a collective bargaining agreement.
The eight NBER defined business cycles over our sample period are the “peak to peak”
business cycle intervals, and are reported here (the intervals are: [1960q2, 1969q4), [1969q4,
1973q4), [1973q4, 1980q1), [1980q1, 1981q3), [1981q3, 1990q3), [1990q3, 2001q1), [2001q1,
2007q4), and [2007q4, 2012q47)). At first glance, this way of choosing the business cycle
dates for the individual states may seem problematic. At close inspection, however, it is safe
to say that states enter and exit business cycles in synchrony with the national economy.
We compare the dates of the peaks and troughs for the nation provided by the NBER to the
state level output series we are using (earnings by place of work) in order to judge how closely
most state economies follow the national economy. We examine the 3 most recent business
cycles and find that 93% of the time, state troughs are within 2 quarters of the national
date, and 79% of the time, state peaks are within 2 quarters of the national date8. Thus, it
seems that the state economies typically move in reasonably close synchrony to the national
economy, helping to justify the use of national business cycle dates for the construction of
all the state-level variables.
For information regarding which states have passed right-to-work legislation and the dates
such legislation was instituted, we referred to the National Right To Work Legal Defense
Foundation’s website, NRTW.org. A simple dummy variable is constructed for each state
for each business cycle. A value of 0 is given a forced-unionism state or to a state which
adopts right-to-work legislation during the given cycle. A value of 1 is given to a state with
right-to-work legislation beginning at any point prior to the current cycle.
7The last business cycle is ongoing, and the next peak has not yet been established. Here,
we use the last quarter for which data is available
892% of state peaks are within 4 quarters of the national date
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Length of expansionary period was calculated using the same series to approximate state
output that has been used throughout the paper, earnings by place of work from the BEA
regional accounts. Earnings was seasonally adjusted and converted into real terms. Length
of expansionary period is simply the number of quarters of expansion in output prior to
a recession. That is, each state will report a number of quarters of expansion for a given
business cycle which comes from the previous expansionary period. Thus, we do not have
this measure for the first cycle beginning in 1960 as it would require the use of data beginning
in 1958, which data is intentionally excluded from this study.
For claims regarding changes in output volatility associated with the Great Moderation,
we construct a measure of output volatility, once again using our proxy for output, earnings
by place of work. To capture how volatile state output has been, we begin by calculating the
growth rate of earnings. We then take the first difference of the growth rate in order to see
where large jumps occur in the growth rate of output. We take the absolute value of this
number as we are not concerned with the direction of the volatility. Now that we have a
quarterly measure of output volatility for each state, which roughly follows McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000), we construct business cycle specific measures. Each business cycle’s
output volatility is simply the average volatility over the entire cycle. In short, that is the
average of the absolute value of the first difference of the growth rate of earnings by place of
work.
The data seem to support the claim of the BEA that earnings may proxy well for produc-
tion. The average correlation coefficient between annual state GDP levels and annual state
earnings by place of work is 0.9977. Thus, at the state level, the correlation between GDP
and our proxy seems very strong when using the annual data. Of course, we cannot evaluate
whether this is also true when using quarterly data (quarterly, state-level GDP measures do
not exist); but we still made an effort to document the quarterly correlation at the national
level. National data for both GDP and earnings by place of work are available at a quarterly
frequency and have a correlation of 0.7272. Both the annual state-level correlations and the
quarterly national-level correlations suggest that earnings is indeed a reasonable proxy for
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GDP.
In addition, given that for the purpose of calculating the JRD we require an approxi-
mation for the percentage changes in GDP and not for the GDP levels themselves, we also
looked at how annual changes in earnings at the state level correlate with annual changes
in state-level GDP. We conducted standard OLS regressions between the state-level, annual
changes in GDP and the corresponding state-level annual changes in earnings. In these re-
gressions, earnings are significant at the 1% level for all 50 states and explain about 75.6%
of the observed variation in GDP, on average (the average R-squared for the 50 regressions
was 0.756).
Health Care by State of Provider is an estimate of the total revenues received by health
care providers for providing health care goods and services within a state for a given year.
These estimates are provided by the Office of the Actuary of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services. The main source of health care data used to construct these estimates
comes from the quinquennial Economic Census. This census collects data every five years for
each state by industry using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
The State of Provider estimates use data from the following industries: Hospital Care,
Physician and Clinical Services, Other Professional Services, Dental Services, Home Health
Care, Nursing Care Facilities and Continuing Care Retirement Communities, Prescription
Drugs and Other Non-Durable Medical Products, Durable Medical Products, and Other
Health, Residential, and Personal Care. The Office of the Actuary uses the Economic Census
data by industry along with some individual hospital and agency data made available for
federal hospitals and agencies within states. Total revenue for each health care industry along
with hospital and state specific values from federal institutions are summed and controlled
to the National Health Expenditure Accounts. Thus, Health Care by State of Provider is an
estimate of total revenue for health care goods and services, not just those paid for by those
using Medicare and Medicaid.
For our health care costs measure, we take total revenue for health care goods and services
as reported by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid services as Health Care by State of
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Provider and convert it into real terms using the GDP deflator. To account for the size of
each state, we then construct real per capita Health Care by State of Provider, using state
population statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau. It is our hope that his measure will be
correlated with employer-specific health care costs.
Finally, for our measure of income inequality at the state level, we use the publicly
available data provided by Frank (2008). Frank constructs Gini coefficients using adjusted
gross income from the IRS’s Statistics of Income publication. We use the corresponding Gini
coefficients for each state at the start of each cycle as our cycle-specific measure of income
inequality. We choose the start of cycle Gini and not the cycle-average Gini to avoid issues
of endogeneity.
5 Empirical Analysis and Results
Using the state-level JRD measures as the dependent variable and elements from our list of
“candidate causes” as explanatory variables, we conduct a series of OLS, fixed-effect, and
random effects regressions. A first set of results can be found in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4
presents the estimated coefficients for simple bivariate OLS regressions. Table 5 presents the
estimated coefficients for multivariate OLS regressions, where candidate causes are added to
the list of explanatory variables one by one. Robust standard errors were used in all cases.
By and large, the results from Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with the theoretical argu-
ments discussed previously: declines in union membership, lengthier expansions predating
the cycles, lower output growth volatility, and higher health care costs are all positively and
significantly associated with more severe jobless recoveries. These correlations are robust
across different econometric specifications used and to the inclusion of lagged JRD values
(not shown). Greater income inequality is also positively associated with the JRD measure,
but the coefficient is not statistically different from zero once other independent variables
are included in the regression.
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Table 4: Bivariate OLS Regressions.













R-sqr 0.002 0.022 0.461 0.003 0.070 0.06
N 400 400 400 400 350 250
T-statistics in parenthesis,***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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Table 5: Multivariate OLS Regressions
1 2 3 4 5 6
Union Mem. -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.008**** -0.014*** -0.008**
(-4.25) (-4.84) (-2.05) (-2.88) (-4.69) (-2.36)
Forced Union 0.293*** 0.164*** 0.136*** 0.174*** 0.210*** 0.010**
(3.27) (3.76) (3.31) (3.75) (3.99) (2.45)
Volatility -3.40*** -3.44*** -3.35*** -3.243*** -1.846***
(-4.52) (-4.55) (-3.60) (-3.57) (-4.65)
Income Ineq. 0.98*** 1.31** -0.63
(2.37) (2.28) (-1.33)




Constant -0.078 0.558*** -0.013 -0.324 0.414** 0.40
(-1.35) (4.72) (-0.06) (-1.29) (2.41) (1.58)
R-sqr 0.041 0.4821 0.4389 0.484 0.4749 0.4906
N 400 400 400 350 350 250
T-statistics in parenthesis, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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Table 6: Fixed-Effects Regressions
1 2 3 4 5 6
Union Membership -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.009** -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.016**
(-3.74) (-4.50) (-2.11) (-3.52) (-4.61) (-2.06)
Forced Unionism 0.174*** 0.247*** 0.276*** 0.260*** 0.248*** 0.315***
(3.63) (3.68) (3.65) (3.88) (3.81) (9.78)
Volatility -2.897*** -2.90*** -3.04*** -3.02*** -1.585***
(-3.23) (-3.23) (-3.48) (-3.50) (-3.14)
Income Inequality 0.947** 0.620 -0.12
(2.29) (1.26) (-0.22)




Constant 0.056 0.553*** -0.09 0.134 0.549** 0.209
(0.97) (3.00) (-0.34) (0.48) (2.39) (0.68)
N 400 400 400 350 350 250
T-statistics in parenthesis, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
However, the forced-unionism dummy is also significantly correlated with the JRD mea-
sure; but the sign of the coefficient is opposite to what we expected initially. A potential
explanation for the positive correlation between the JRD measures and the forced-unionism
dummy could be that differences between right-to-work and forced-unionism laws change
the nature of the bargaining between firms and workers away from employment warranties
and towards other objectives. But we have no evidence to support that claim. Furthermore,
the fact that forced-unionism legislation is likely to be related to other, potentially omitted,
state-level characteristics makes it possible for the OLS estimates to suffer from endogeneity
biases and calls for the use of fixed-effects techniques instead of OLS.
The estimated coefficients from the fixed-effects regressions are provided in Table 6.
As shown in this table, the results obtained from the fixed effects regressions do not vary
much from those obtained in the OLS regressions. The one exception is that the estimated
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Table 7: Random-Effects Regressions
1 2 3 4 5 6
Union Membership -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.006** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.008**
(-3.77) (-4.41) (-2.14) (-2.65) (-4.52) (-2.58)
Forced Unionism 0.28*** 0.164*** 0.136*** 0.174*** 0.210*** 0.010**
(2.26) (4.80) (4.50) (5.45) (5.81) (2.52)
Volatility -3.40*** -3.44*** -3.35*** -3.24*** -1.846***
(-4.69) (-4.72) (-4.85) (-4.78) (-4.48)
Income Inequality 0.983** 1.31*** -0.632
(2.39) (2.70) (-1.35)




Constant -0.03 0.558*** -0.013 -0.324 0.414*** 0.406
(-0.48) (4.36) (-0.07) (-1.49) (2.82) (1.79)
N 400 400 400 350 350 250
T-statistics in parenthesis, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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coefficient on the health care costs variable now becomes insignificant and does not appear
to have an effect on the magnitude or depth of jobless recoveries. For comparison purposes,
the estimated coefficients from the random effects regressions are also provided in Table
7. The results are again very similar with the exception of the health care costs variable
which appears significantly correlated with the JRD in the random effects specification.
A Hausman specification test for this last regression in column 6, however, suggests the
use of fixed effects is more appropriate, consistent with our prior beliefs about the correct
specification.
6 Conclusion
While there are many competing theories as to what may cause jobless recoveries, it is clear
that the empirical work necessary to complement the existing research has lagged behind.
The reason, at least in part, is that the few empirical studies that have been carried out
to date have utilized national level data and have been forced to work with a small sample
size, typically including only two instances of jobless recoveries (or three if you count the
ongoing cycle). The state-level data we have gathered here, in contrast, provides us with 50
times the instances of jobless recoveries. This gives us a unique opportunity to exploit the
variation found across states and help create tests for the alternative theories. We believe we
have convincingly shown that jobless recoveries are a somewhat localized event with strong
variation across states and time. We encourage future research to exploit this variation in
the magnitude of jobless recoveries at the state level, and to extend the use of the JRD
measure to other cross-sectional analyses as well. Some examples might be a study of jobless
recoveries at the MSA or industry levels.
Previous research has presented only weak empirical results, in large part due to the
lack of a comprehensive measure which allows positive statements about jobless recoveries
to be made. Without such a measure, any efforts to quantify the effects of independent
variables on the severity of jobless recoveries are fruitless. We believe the Jobless Recovery
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Depth (JRD) measure can serve that purpose and can help settle many of the debates that
surround jobless recovery questions in ways which were not possible before. Our claim is that
such types of comprehensive measures are necessary for the study of multidimensional events
like the so called jobless recoveries and that the JRD is one simple, intuitive alternative. We
have displayed how this measure might be used to conduct empirical analysis that will help
narrow down the pool of competing explanations in the literature, moving us closer to an
understanding of the factors truly correlated with jobless recoveries.
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A Appendix: Additional Results
We would like to provide a deeper understanding of how relocation correlates with jobless
recoveries, and about the potentially different effects of job-change-related relocation, career-
change-related relocation, and geographic-move-related relocation. For that purpose, we
collected data on related variables. These variables are less than ideal and their use reduces
our sample size significantly. We explain each of them in turn.
We collected data on the states’ home-ownership rate; which has been shown to have a
statistical link to both, decreased labor mobility and increased joblessness (see Blanchflower
and Oswald 2013). Home-ownership is defined as the percentage of housing units occupied
by owner at the beginning of a cycle. The data was taken from the United States Census
Bureau It is available every year after 1983 and once every 10 years going back to 1900.
However, data available every ten years cannot be used for our analysis. So, we construct
a cycle-specific measure, using the average home-ownership rates over the cycle for the four
most recent business cycles only.
We also constructed a job-relocation measure at the state level, as the sum of the total job
destruction and total job creation observed in a state during a particular cycle, averaged over
the duration of the cycle. State-level, quarterly job destruction and job creation statistics
are reported by the BLS in their Business Employment Dynamics database. The BLS does
not specify the particular industries in which jobs are being gained or lost, but an overall
measure of all turnover across all industries. Since the data reported starts with quarter 3
of 1992, our job relocation measure for the 1990-2001 business cycle was built without data
on the first 7 quarters. Data on all previous cycles is not available
Finally, a geographical-relocation variable was derived from the Statistics of Income Mi-
gration Data reported by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS tracks the number of
exemptions claimed on tax returns filed each year where the state of residence has changed
for that filer relative to the previous year. Inflows are the total number of exemptions en-
tering the state from another state; outflows are the total number of exemptions leaving the
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state for another. We construct our geographical relocation measure by adding the inflows
and outflows reported by the states in any particular year and taking the average of these
annual numbers over the duration of the cycle. The data was obtained from the Tax Foun-
dation website (taxfoundation.org). Admittedly, the tax exemptions data allows us to gauge
relocation across states, but ignores any relocation activity generated within states.
The data we obtained covers from 1993 to 2010 only and fails to capture migration
occurring in the first 2 years of the 1990-2001 business cycle and the most recent two years
of the present cycle. As before, when constructing the measure for the cycles, we applied
the average taken over the available data to the entire cycle. Omitting the first two years of
the 1990-2001 cycle likely biases our relocation measure down, because interstate migration
tends to be higher during the recession (which occurs at the start of the cycle). While
omitting the last two years of the current cycle likely biases our measure up. On average,
interstate migration has been declining steadily over the sample period and jobless recoveries
have been shown to get more severe at the same time. Thus, we would expect the incomplete
data to bias any estimated correlations between the JRD and the geographical relocation
measures towards zero.
Table 8 shows the results of the corresponding OLS, fixed-effects and random-effects
regressions that include the homeownership and worker relocation measures in the set of
explanatory variables. The inclusion of the additional variables reduces the sample size from
400 to 200 observations when the homeownership variable is included, and from 400 to 150
observations when the relocation variables are included. For that reason, we present the two
sets of regressions separately. As shown in the table, when these new variables are introduced,
the results obtained for the other variables are similar to those discussed in the main body
of the paper. The estimated coefficients for the homeownership and relocation variables,
however, are always insignificant. Thus, the evidence from our reduced-sample analysis
suggests that relocation and household mobility do not significantly explain variations in the
magnitude of jobless recoveries.
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Table 8: Reduced Sample Regressions.
1 2 3 4 5 6
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Union Membership -0.003 0.02 -0.003 -0.003 -0.011 -0.003
(-1.21) (0.53) (-1.2 ) (-0.59) (-0.55) (-0.63)
Forced Unionism 0.079** 0.20*** .079** 0.075 0.078 0.075*
(2.55) (7.20) (2.43) (1.66) (1.27) (1.90)
Volatility -0.976*** -0.455 -0.96*** -1.2*** -1.25*** -1.2***
(-4.04) (-1.37) (-3.34) (-3.14) (-3.23) (-3.47)
Income Inequality -0.171 -0.07 -0.165 -1.06* -0.376 -1.06*
(-0.33) (-0.09) (-0.3) (-1.71) (-0.33) (-1.92)
Expansion 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.004* 0.002 0.004*
(4.44) (3.01) (4.02) (1.93) (0.86) (1.95)
Health-care Costs 0.025** 0.033* 0.024** 0.004 -0.003 0.004
(2.19) (1.86) (2.25) (0.26) (-0.09) (0.27)
Home Ownership -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004
(-0.86) (-0.37) (-0.97) (-0.88) (-0.97) (-0.96)
Geo. Relocation 0.0005 -0.038 0.005
(0.21) (-1.74) (0.27)
Job Relocation 0.0006 0.017** 0.0006
(0.38) (2.09) (0.54)
Constant 0.13 -0.16 0.131 1.02 1.53 1.02
(0.33) (-0.28) (0.31 ) (1.58) (1.40) (1.88)*
R-sqr 0.275 0.14 0.27 0.25 0.01 0.25
N 200 200 200 150 150 150
T-statistics in parenthesis, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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Abstract
In recent years, a good deal of attention has been given to the broad decline in output volatil-
ity in the United States, commonly referred to as the Great Moderation. Several competing
theories have been suggested, including changes in policy, decreased volatility of the durable
goods sector, and a change in the nature of aggregate shocks. Nearly all studies of the Great
Moderation in the United States have focused on national output data. This paper examines
the changes in output volatility at the state level using a quarterly proxy of state-level GDP.
Our findings support research linking the Great Moderation to reductions in volatility in




The broad decline in output volatility beginning in the mid 1980’s is a subject that has
received considerable attention in the literature over the last 15 years. While it is nearly
universally acknowledged that a Great Moderation in output occurred during this time, there
remains a good deal of debate as to why. Most explanations fit into one of three categories:
good policies, good practices, or good luck. While proponents of the improved policy argu-
ment focus mostly on monetary policy and the recent reduction in inflation volatility that
accompanies the reduced fluctuations in output, those who argue for good practices point out
that the reduction in volatility is not universal, but rather concentrated in specific sectors,
such as durable goods. However, the literature surrounding each argument, by and large,
fails to utilize the rich resource of state-level data to test their claims. We attempt to shed
further light on some of the factors which may have contributed to the Great Moderation
by examining all 50 state economies from the period of 1960-2012.
It is important to understand the characteristics and timing of a structural break in
output volatility for a number of reasons. One such example on the empirical front is that
linear models of output growth that cover the break period will be misspecified. Another
popular method for testing theories against the data is to compare the moments of the
data of calibrated models with the moments of real-world data. However, the presence of
a structural break over the sample period will affect how second and higher moments of
output growth need to be calculated. Also, the signal-to-noise ratio of Markov-switching
models of business-cycle fluctuations will be decreased if a constant variance is used as
shown by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). There are obvious policy implications as
well, since changes in output growth that were once considered to be relatively small may
now be thought of as large, which may affect optimal policy decisions in response to these
fluctuations. Also, recent research has linked declines in output volatility to the problem of
jobless recoveries experienced in recent U.S. business cycles (Mendez and Reber, 2014).
In this paper, we closely examine the findings linking the Great Moderation to a decline
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in volatility stemming from the durable goods sector (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000;
Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Kahn, et al., 2002; Owyang, et al., 2008) and to the advent
of interstate banking in the U.S. (Morgan, et al., 2004; Owyang et al., 2008). Studies of
the relationship between durable goods volatility and total output volatility have mostly
focused on the issue at the national level. However, the nation provides only one series of
date with which to test this theory. The states, on the other hand, provide fifty times the
data, allowing for a much richer empirical analysis. One other research paper, by Owyang, et
al. (2008), attempts an empirical study of the Great Moderation at the state level, however,
their specification does not use an output measure, but rather utilizes state-level employment
data. We discuss the issues with using employment data in place of output, especially over
the period of the Great Moderation, and show that a suitable alternative to proxy for state
output does exist.
We closely follow the empirical methodology put forth by McConnell and Perez-Quiros
in their seminal paper from 2000 which documents the structural break in U.S. output
volatility in the first quarter of 1984. We document similar structural breaks for many
of the individual states, with a great deal of heterogeneity in the timing of the estimated
break dates. Moreover, we are able to replicate their analysis showing that the durable good
sector is a driving force behind the Great Moderation with the state-level data. Our findings
strongly suggest that breaks in volatility in the growth contribution of durable goods and
the growth rate of durable goods are one of the main factors contributing to the decline in
output volatility on the whole.
Having documented the structural break in output volatility at the state level, we then
apply our findings to the research spearheaded by Morgan, et al. (2004) linking the Great
Moderation to the proliferation of interstate banking laws. Comparing our results to the
dates when states first allowed interstate banking, we are able to show how output volatility
in each state may have been effected by this deregulation. However, the data suggests that
the advent of interstate banking does a poor job of explaining the break in output volatility
at the state level, and fails to match up with the timing of the national break. We do not
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examine how other policy changes, such as monetary policy changes, may have influenced
output volatility at the state level in this paper, but urge future research to do so.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the proposed causes of
the Great Moderation as found in the literature, Section 3 discusses the data and shows that
there is a great deal of variation at the state-level worth exploiting, Section 4 conducts our
empirical analysis and the results are discussed, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature on The Great Moderation
One of the first papers to document the decline in output volatility in the national data,
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), put forth the idea that the rapid decrease in GDP
could be driven by volatility reduction in just one, or a few, of the components of GDP.
They investigated this idea and found evidence suggesting that the Great Moderation is
largely attributable to reductions in volatility of durable goods. Future research continued
to test their theory, with others finding evidence that the durable goods sector was a major
contributing factor to the Great Moderation (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Kahn et al., 2002;
Summers, 2005; Owyang et al., 2008). McConnell and Perez-Quiros also find that other
sectors did not experience a similar decline in volatility, strongly suggesting that changes in
the nature of fluctuations in durable goods are the driving factor in understanding where the
decline in output has come from. Others, such as Blanchard and Simon (2001), also found
evidence that inventory investments have seen a dramatic decline in volatility.
Another proposed explanation for the change in output volatility is the increase in bank
integration across states (Morgan, et al., 2004; Owyang, et al., 2008) First proposed by
Morgan, et al. (2004), this theory explains how a movement away from small, state-based
banking systems to an integrated nation-wide banking system may have had an affect upon
output fluctuations. For instance, as businesses face difficult economic times in one state,
they may require increased bank capital. However, the banks within that state are likely to
feel the stress of the poor economic conditions as well, making them ill-equipped to assist in-
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state businesses. If regulation stipulates that no out-of-state banking options are available,
this could lead to further economic decline as well as possible bank failures. However, opening
up state boarders to banking services may help alleviate these sorts of regional issues and
stabilize the changes in output.
Yet another of the potential causes of the Great Moderation is an improvement in mon-
etary policy (Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; Summers, 2005; Cogley and Sargent, 2005; Stock
and Watson, 2002) The argument is that there has been a sort of regime shift in U.S. mone-
tary policy that is responsible for the reduction in output volatility (Sims and Zha, 2006). As
the Fed has changed the way it responds to inflation and the output gap, with less willingness
to try to fine tune output and more focus on price stability, this has reduced fluctuations
in aggregate output growth. One argument against the claim that good monetary policy is
responsible for the Great Moderation is the fact that the components of output have been
differentially affected by this change in volatility. More specifically, an argument has to be
made as to why the durable goods sector seems to be at the heart of the Great Moderation
when policy has no theoretical differential effect across industries.
Finally, it has been suggested that “good luck” or a fortunate change in the nature of
aggregate shocks has led to the widespread reduction in volatility (Stock and Watson, 2002;
Ahmed, et al., 2004; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiano and Primiceri, 2006). Two of
the most commonly identified shocks which are potentially behind the Great Moderation
are energy shocks and productivity shocks. However, Giannone, et al. (2008) review the
literature on the “good luck” hypothesis and conclude that the models which pointed to
shocks as the driving force behind the Great Moderation were excessively naive, and that
omitted variable problems caused the variance of the shocks to be overestimated.
3 The Data
Studies of the Great Moderation have typically considered the problem at the national level.
Usually, the measure of national level output used for analysis is real GDP. However, state-
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level GDP data coming from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts is only available annually
from 1963-2012. This is the data used by Morgan, et al. (2004) in their small sample size,
state-level study of the Great Moderation and bank deregulation. However, annual data
does not allow one to observe the fluctuations in variables throughout the business cycle. It
is desirable to have a measure of output that is at least available at a quarterly frequency.
Therefore, we set out to find a proxy for GDP at the state level that is available at the
desired frequency.
In the only other state-level empirical study of the Great Moderation of which we are
aware, Owyang, et al. (2008) also abstain from using annual state GDP data due to it’s
limitations in capturing output volatility over the business cycle. Their solution is to use
state level employment data coming from the BLS. Using employment data in place of
output, they estimate structural break dates for each state from which they draw conclusions
regarding the proposed causes of the Great Moderation. However, the use of employment
data in place of output is clearly problematic. Perhaps the most important reason is that
the behavior of state-level employment and output have been diverging in recent business
cycles as documented in Mendez and Reber (2014). The continued decline in employment
after output recovery begins, known as a jobless recovery, has been well documented at the
national level and has been shown to correspond to the timing of the Great Moderation.
Mendez and Reber also show that this is true for many of the individual states, suggesting
that employment makes for a poor measure of output volatility for the period associated
with the Great Moderation.
We show that a suitable state-level proxy for output does exist. Personal income data by
state is reported on a quarterly basis by the BEA. One of these components, called earnings
by place of work, was chosen as our proxy of state output. According to the BEA, “Earnings
by place of work is the sum of Wage and Salary Disbursements, supplements to wages and
salaries and proprietor’s income. BEA presents earnings by place of work because it can be
used in the analysis of regional economies as a proxy for the income that is generated from
participation in current production.” Thus, we feel that Earnings by place of work may be
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a reasonable proxy for state output.
The data seem to support the claim of the BEA, and justify out use of earnings as a
proxy for state-level output. The average correlation coefficient between annual state GDP
levels and annual state earnings by place of work is 0.9977. Thus, at the state level, the
correlation between GDP and our proxy seems very strong when using the annual data. Of
course, we cannot evaluate whether this is also true when using quarterly data (quarterly,
state-level GDP measures do not exist); but we still made an effort to document the quarterly
correlation at the national level. National data for both GDP and earnings by place of work
are available at a quarterly frequency and have a correlation of 0.7272. Both the annual
state-level correlations and the quarterly national-level correlations suggest that earnings is
indeed a reasonable proxy for GDP.
In addition, given that for the purpose of this paper we will estimate equations using the
growth rates of output in percentage terms, we also look at how annual changes in earnings
at the state level correlate with annual changes in state-level GDP. We conducted standard
OLS regressions between the state-level, annual growth rates in GDP and the corresponding
state-level annual growth rates in earnings. In these regressions, earnings are significant at
the 1% level for all 50 states and explain about 75.6% of the observed variation in GDP, on
average (the average R-squared for the 50 regressions was 0.756). This further supports our
use of earnings as a proxy of state-level GDP.
Additional adjustments must be made to the earnings by place of work to make the
series more comparable to the measure of output used at the national level (GDP), and to
allow for meaningful comparison across time and states. The earnings data is nominal and
not seasonally adjusted. We first seasonally adjust the earnings data for each state using
the X12 ARIMA process provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. The nominal, seasonally
adjusted series is then converted into real earnings using the GDP deflator. This provides
a real, seasonally adjusted earnings measure for each state which can be used as a proxy
for GDP. Importantly, this measure is available over the desired period, 1960:Q1-2012:Q41,
12013 state-level earnings data was not available at the time this paper was written
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and at the desired quarterly frequency. Other potential proxies for state GDP failed to meet
either the range of frequency requirements.
Data on durable goods production at the state level is taken from the BEA Regional
Accounts as well. State-level GDP by industry is only available at an annual frequency.
As mentioned before, annual data is a poor choice for modeling volatility in output and for
testing for the presence of structural breaks. However, earnings data from the durable goods
sector is reported in the state personal income accounts at a quarterly frequency. We use
this data from 1960:Q1-2012:Q4. It should be noted that a continuous series is only available
for 46 of the 50 states, as 4 of the states have significant periods of missing values2. The
durable goods earnings data is seasonally adjusted using the same X12 ARIMA seasonal
adjustment process, and is then converted to real terms using the GDP deflator. This real,
seasonally-adjusted series for durable goods is used to construct the growth rate of durable
goods variable, and the growth contribution of durable goods variable used later in the paper.
With this state-level data in hand, we first wish to visually inspect the data to identify an
periods of seemingly dramatic change in volatility. The existence of the Great Moderation in
the data is often displayed by plotting the growth rate of real GDP over time. The national
data is plotted in Figure 1. In like manor, we plot the growth rate of real earnings (our
GDP proxy), for all 50 states in Figure 2. Inspection of the data shows what appears to be
a noticeable drop in the volatility of output growth for many of the individual states which
mirrors the change in the national-level data.
2The 4 states which are omitted from our durable goods calculations due to missing values
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Figure 1: National growth rate of output using quarterly real GDP.
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Figure 2: State-level growth rate of output using real quarterly earnings by place of work.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Author’s calculations
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However, it is very difficult to see exactly how many states are experiencing a Great
Moderation by plotting all 50 series at once. Instead, consider the standard deviation of
output for the two periods before and after the start date of the Great Moderation most
commonly referenced in the literature, 1984:Q1. By taking the difference in the standard
deviation of output from the pre-1984 period to the post-1984 period, we are able to see how
the change in volatility for each state compares to the nation as a whole. This is shown in
Figure 3. Interestingly, when we impose the national start date for the Great Moderation
we see a great deal of variation across states. The decline in output volatility is greater than
the national decline for some states, while other states actually see an increase in volatility
after 1984. We see that 18 states experienced a “moderation” in output volatility greater in
magnitude than that of the U.S., 24 states experienced a “moderation” smaller in magnitude
than the U.S., and 9 states actually experienced increased in volatility around the date of
the national moderation. Clearly, imposing the national start date for each state is not
appropriate, and we will test for the break date in each state individually. However, the
point remains that the states vary greatly one from another and provide a great opportunity
for testing the separate theories on the causes of the Great Moderation.
The final piece of information our study requires is the date of banking deregulation for
each state. Data on the year that each state began allowing interstate banking is taken
from Morgan, et al. (2004). They report the year in which out-of-state bank entry was first
allowed for each state. These are the years presented later in Table ?? of the paper, and




























































Figure 3: Difference in standard deviation of output growth from the pre-1984 and post-1984
periods. The dashed line represents the value for the United States as a whole. 9 states have
negative values, suggesting an increase in output volatility between the two periods. 24 had
a “moderation” smaller in magnitude than the nation, and 18 had a “moderation” greater
in magnitude than the nation as a whole.
4 Emperical Analysis and Results
4.1 Estimating Structural Breaks in Output
In order to utilize the state-level output data to help explain the Great Moderation, we
follow closely the methodologies used in the past for analyzing the national data. However,
finding evidence to support a theory with one series of data (national output) could be an
aberration, whereas a finding coming from fifty series of state-level output data would be
much more robust. Perhaps the biggest innovation of this paper is the extension of existing
tests to new, state-level data. We first set out to estimate the timing of structural breaks in
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output volatilty for each state using our state-level GDP proxy, earnings. Then, we examine
well the finding that the decline in volatility emanates from the durable goods sector holds
up under an analysis of our larger data set. Next, the claim that the advent of interstate
banking caused the Great Moderation is put to the test.
Following the seminal work of McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), we employ the Qaundt-
Andrews Breakpoint Test to determine whether there is a structural break in output volatil-
ity over our sample period for equation (1) for each state. Output growth is modeled as an
AR(1) process3. The Quandt-Andrews test (Andrews, 1993; Andrews and Ploberger, 1994)
performs a series of individual Chow breakpoint tests (Chow, 1960) for every observation
between the beginning and end dates in the sample, τ1 and τ2. The test statistics from the
individual Chow tests, k in number, are then summarized into a single test statistic which
is used to test against the null hypothesis of no structural break over the sample (between
τ1 and τ2).
∆yt = µ+ φ∆yt−1 + εt (1)
There are two statistics saved from each of the individual Chow breakpoint tests: the
Wald F-statistic, and the Likelihood Ratio F-statistic. However, for linear equations these
two F-statistics are identical. All of the resulting F-statistics from the Chow tests can then
be summarized into three test statistics comprising the Quandt-Andrews test statistics: the
Maximum or Sup statistic which takes the maximum of the individual Chow F-statistics as
found in equation (2), the Exp test statistic as in equation (3), and the Ave statistic which
is an average of the individual Chow F-statistics, as found in equation (4). The Maximum
test statistic is typically used to indicate the most likely breakpoint over the sample.
3The lag lengths selection for each state was done using the partial autocorrelation func-
tions and confirmed using the SIC and AIC lag length criteria. For 46 of the 50 states,
a 1 period lag cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Two states (Alaska and Indiana) are
AR(2), and two states (North Carolina and Washington) are AR(3). Equation 1 is adjusted
appropriately for these longer lags when performing analysis on these four states.
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These three test statistics have non-standard distributions. Approximate asymptotic
p-values were provided by Hansen (1997) and are used in our analysis. However, these
distributions degenerate as one as the endpoints, τ1 or τ2, are approached. Thus, it is
standard practice to eliminate several of the observations near the beginning and end of the
sample. This is commonly referred to as “trimming” and a “trimming” of 15% is the norm,
where 7.5% of the observations at the start of the sample and 7.5% of the observations at
the end of the sample are excluded. This is also consistent with the “trimming” percentages
used my McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000).
The results of our breakpoint tests are found in Table 14. Here, we see what one might
have expected after inspecting Figure 2. While the data supports the findings at the national
level that there has been a break in output growth, we see that the dates of this break vary
widely across different places in the U.S. Furthermore, there are several states with break
points after the year 2000. These are more likely structural breaks in which output volatility
is increasing as we approach the more volatile period towards the end of the sample. In order
to gain a better understanding of how state-level volatility declines compare to the nation as
whole, we reduce our sample size to 1960:Q1-2004:Q4. The resulting break point estimates
are shown in Table 2. The end point of 2004 is selected for two reasons. The first is to
4For Table 1, the test statistic used for statistical significance of the break point is the
Maximum test statistic from equation (2). All three Quandt-Andrews test statistics and
their accompanying p-values are reported in a larger table in the Appendix.
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eliminate many of the more volatile recent years from the sample. Remember that 7.5% of
the observations on each end of the sample will be trimmed when performing the Quandt-
Andrews test, so this will eliminate nearly all of the new millennium, thus removing the time
period over which significant increases associated with the end of the Great Moderation are
likely to be seen. Also, this reduced sample matches up with the timing of Morgan, et al.’s
research from 2004 on interstate banking. Thus, the reduced sample may provide a nice test
of how well their theory held up at the time their paper was written.
From Tables 1 and 2 we see that many states experienced statistically significant struc-
tural breaks in output growth over the respective sample periods. Many states experienced
breaks prior to the national date of 1984:Q1, and many experienced breaks after. The range
over which state-level breaks are observed is quite staggering. This makes our next finding
regarding changes in the volatility of durable goods all the more surprising.
4.2 Durable Goods
Now, we wish to examine whether or not a decline in output volatility in the durable goods
sector is driving the state-level Great Moderations we are observing. This has been one of
the most popular explanations found in the literature (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000;
Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Kahn et al., 2002; Summers, 2005; Owyang et al., 2008).
Following McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), we estimate equation (1) again, with two
separate durable goods measures in place of y : the growth contribution of durables and the
growth rate of durables. The growth contribution is measured as durable goods’ share of
nominal output (earnings) in period t-1 times the real growth rate of durable goods in period
t. McConnell and Perez-Quiros argue that a break in the growth contribution of durable
goods signals a potentially causal role for declining aggregate volatility. A break in the
growth rate of the durable goods sector indicates that the break in the growth contribution
is coming from reduced volatility within the durables sector, not just a change in durables
share of output.
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Table 1: Structural Breaks for Each State by Year, 1960:Q1-2012:Q4. The results
of the Maximum test statistic of the Quandt-Andrews break point test using p-values from
Hansen (1997).





1974 ID* NC SC*















2000 CA*** GA** OR** VT*** WA***
2001 AZ* CO*** CT** UT**
2004 MO*** NH*** RI*
2005 DE*** NV** NM**
































































































































































































































































































































































The same Quandt-Andrews tests are repeated for each state again, using the growth rate
and growth contribution of durable goods to estimate equation (1). The results are displayed
in Table 3. Once again, the break dates are those coming from the Maximum test statistic
in equation (2), and statistical significance using Hansen (1997) p-values is reported. Several
of the states have significant breaks in the growth contribution of durables very close to the
timing of the national break date of 1984:Q1. We see that 28 of the 46 states (or about 61%)
have statistically significant break points for both growth contribution and growth rate of
durable goods that are within 2 quarters of one another. Thus, we have evidence suggesting
that variation within the durable goods sector is actually experiencing a dramatic change in
volatility over our sample period, with nearly simultaneous breaks in the growth contribution
driving aggregate output volatility declines.
Perhaps even more compelling than Table 3, are the histograms of the break dates in
durable goods’ growth contribution and growth rate found in Figure 4. The distribution
appears to be roughly normal with a large peak in 1984. Also, we have very similar shapes
in the distribution of breaks for both variables, suggesting that volatility within the durable
goods sector, not just in its share of output, may be driving the observed declines in state-
level volatility. This finding is consistent with the findings of McConnell and Perez-Quiros,
and derives greater strength from the use of a much larger data set.
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State Break in Growth Contribution Break in Growth Rate Matching Breaks
AL 1988Q2* 1988Q2
AZ 1987Q2*** 1987Q2*** !
AR 1978Q2*** 1978Q2*** !
CA 2000Q1*** 2000Q1*** !
CO 1981Q3*** 1981Q3** !
CT 1976Q*** 1976Q3*** !
DE 1994Q1 2000Q1
FL 1988Q2*** 1982Q2*** !
GA 1992Q4*** 1992Q4*** !




KS 1984Q1*** 1984Q1*** !
KY 1984Q2* 1984Q2* !
LA 1988Q2*** 1988Q2*** !
ME 1980Q1*** 1980Q1*** !
MD 1969Q4 2001Q2***
MA 1984Q4*** 1984Q4** !
MI 1972Q4** 1973Q1
MN 1984Q4*** 1984Q4*** !
MS 1978Q2** 1977Q4*** !
MO 1968Q4* 1994Q3
MT 1984Q2*** 1984Q2** !
NE 1984Q1*** 1984Q1*** !
NV 1984Q1*** 1984Q1*** !
NH 1987Q4*** 2000Q1***
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NJ 1980Q1** 1980Q1** !





OK 1981Q2** 1981Q2*** !
OR 1979Q3 1979Q3
PA 1989Q1* 1989Q1*** !
SC 1989Q1*** 1988Q4*** !
SD 1986Q3*** 1990Q1
TN 1984Q1*** 1984Q1*** !
TX 1988Q2*** 1988Q2*** !
UT 1987Q4 1987Q4
VT 1978Q2*** 2001Q1***
VA 1988Q4*** 1988Q4*** !
WA 1986Q4*** 1983Q3***
WV 1984Q3*** 1984Q3** !
WI 1984Q1* 1984Q1** !
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.































































































In their study of bank integration and output volatility in state business cycles, Morgan, et
al. (2004) find that increases in bank integration across states is correlated with a significant
decline in output volatility. Thus, from their findings one would expect a measure of bank
integration to be significantly and positively correlated with fluctuations in output5. Also,
one would expect the proposed “cause” to occur prior to the change in volatility. One can
compare the dates of the structural breaks in output to the dates in which interstate banking
was allowed to see if this hypothesis holds.
Taking the years that interstate banking was first allowed in each state from Morgan, et
al. and our estimated structural break dates from Table 1, we are able to see whether the
deregulation allowing interstate banking came before or after the break in output growth.
If it came before, then this is consistent with the story told by Morgan, et al. However,
if the change in banking law came after the structural change, then this does not support
their claim. These dates are presented in Table 4, and a histogram showig the distribution of
state break dates and deregulation dates in found in Figure 6. However, simply checking that
interstate banking came before the break is not enough to claim support for Morgan, et al.’s
theory. The structural break dates for several states occur in the year 2000 or later. These
breaks do not nearly match up with the national break date of 1984, and as mentioned
before, these break dates may be the result of volatility increases toward the end of our
sample. In each of these cases, the break in output is occurring many years after the start
of interstate banking, often a decade or more later. This is hardly evidence that the switch
to interstate banking is the cause of these breaks. Thus, we argue that states with break
dates in the 2000’s also fail to support Morgan, et al. and are removed from the tally of
states which support their hypothesis in Column 5. Also, given that it may be too easy to
find a structural break using Chow tests, especially at the 10% level, we consider only those
5These degree of bank integration measures used by Morgan, et al. (2004) were the
“interstate asset ratio” and the “other state asset ratio”, however, these were only available
annually from 1976-1994. The sample is quite small, and due to the problems of using annual
data already discussed, we elected not to use this data.
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states which had breaks at the 5% level or higher. States which fail to support the Morgan
hypothesis at the 5% level are removed from the final tally reported in Column 6.
Considering only those states where the deregulation and structural break occur in the
appropriate order, the break occurs before 2000, and the estimated break is significant at
the 5% level as supporting Morgan’s hypothesis, we are left with only 10 of the 50 states
that meet these criteria. That is, using our full sample, 1960:Q1-2012:Q4, only 20% of states
support the interstate banking theory of the Great Moderation. From an inspection of the
histograms in Figure 6, we see quite clearly that many states experienced a break in output
prior to the deregulation of interstate banking laws, and many states experienced a break long
afterwards, with only a few state break dates corresponding to the period of deregulation.
Also, the majority of states starting allowing interstate banking after the national date of
the Great Moderation.
As discussed previously, some of these later break points, after 2000, may be the result
of volatility increases near the end of our sample period. Once again, we reduce the sample
to consider only 1960:Q1-2004:Q4, which dates help to eliminate the breaks arising from
increasing volatility and also match up with the timing of Morgan’s initial publication. Such
an exercise can only make it easier to find support for Morgan’s theory since it is eliminating
many of the break dates on the far right of the distribution, far removed from the timing of
bank deregulation. The results from this slightly reduced sample are found in Table 5, with
accompanying histograms in Figure 5. Although there are a few more states which now seem
to follow the Morgan hypothesis, we still fail to see much support for interstate banking.
The number individual states which now have a structural break in output occurring after
the change in banking laws which is significant at the 5% level is 19, up from 10 in our full
sample. However, the histograms tell the same story as before; most states experienced a
structural break in output volatility well before or well after interstate banking began.
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State Interstate Banking Break Point Order Pre-2000’s 5% sig.




CA 1987 2000Q4*** !
CO 1988 2001Q2*** !
CT 1982 2001Q2** !
DE 1988 2005Q1*** !
FL 1985 1973Q4***
GA 1985 2000Q3** !
HI 1997 1970Q3***
ID 1985 1974Q2*
IL 1986 1988Q2** ! ! !




LA 1987 1988Q1*** ! ! !
ME 1978 1972Q3**
MD 1985 1990Q2*** ! ! !
MA 1983 1992Q1*** ! ! !
MI 1986 1986Q1* ! !
MN 1986 1980Q3*
MS 1988 1972Q2***




NV 1985 2005Q1* !
NH 1987 2004Q4*** !
NJ 1986 1991Q2*** ! ! !
NM 1989 2005Q1** !
NY 1982 1988Q2*** ! ! !
NC 1985 1974Q2
ND 1991 1981Q1**
OH 1985 1985Q3** ! ! !
OK 1987 1982Q3***
OR 1986 2000Q4* !
PA 1986 1989Q2*** ! ! !
RI 1984 2004Q1* !
SC 1986 1974Q2*
SD 1988 1975Q1
TN 1985 1987Q2** ! ! !
TX 1987 1981Q4
UT 1984 2001Q3** !
VT 1988 2000Q3*** !
VA 1985 1973Q3**




***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.























































































Figure 5: Distribution of estimated break dates and interstate banking dates: 1960:Q1-2012:Q4
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5 Conclusion
We have shown that the Great Moderation is not only observed in the aggregated national
data, but at the state level as well. Furthermore, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in
the break points in output volatility across states. Theories which attempt to explain the
cause of the decline in output volatility at the national level should also be able to explain
the state-level decline in volatility. Using a quarterly proxy of state output, and durable
goods, we perform Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint tests for each state. Our results
strongly support the findings in the literature linking the Great Moderation to a break in
output volatility in the durable goods sector. However, our results do not support theories
linking the Great Moderation to the advent of interstate banking.
Past empirical work on this topic has failed to utilize the rich resource of state-level data
to put the existing theories to the test. This paper provides an initial attempt to take some
of these theories to the state-level data, using a quarterly state output proxy. We encourage
future research to continue this effort by testing theories of improved monetary policy and
changing nature of aggregate shocks using the more abundant data from the states. These
results will shed further light on the true cause(s) of the Great Moderation, and improve our
understanding of how output growth changes over time.
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A Additional figures from reduced-sample analysis
State Interstate Banking Break Point Order Pre-2000’s 5% sig.
AL 1987 1988Q1*** ! ! !
AK 1982 1975Q2*
AZ 1986 1992Q4** ! ! !
AR 1989 1966Q3***
CA 1987 1993Q2** ! ! !
CO 1988 1992Q1*** ! ! !
CT 1982 1992Q1* !
DE 1988 1973Q4
FL 1985 1973Q4***
GA 1985 1993Q1*** ! ! !
HI 1997 1970Q3***
ID 1985 1986Q3** ! ! !
IL 1986 1992Q1*** ! ! !




LA 1987 1992Q3*** ! ! !
ME 1978 1972Q3***
MD 1985 1990Q2*** ! ! !
MA 1983 1992Q1*** ! ! !
MI 1986 1986Q1** ! ! !
MN 1986 1982Q4**
MS 1988 1972Q2**




NV 1985 1992Q1*** ! ! !
NH 1987 2000Q2*** ! !
NJ 1986 1991Q2*** ! ! !
NM 1989 1978Q4***
NY 1982 1988Q2*** ! ! !
NC 1985 2000Q4* !
ND 1991 1981Q1**
OH 1985 1989Q2*** ! ! !
OK 1987 1978Q1***
OR 1986 2000Q4** ! !
PA 1986 1989Q2*** ! ! !






VT 1988 2000Q3*** ! !
VA 1985 1969Q2*
WA 1987 1993Q1* !
WV 1988 1981Q4**
WI 1987 2000Q4** ! !
WY 1987 1983Q1



















































































Figure 6: Distribution of estimated break dates and interstate banking dates: 1960:Q1-2012:Q4
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State Break Date Max (p-values) Exp (p-values) Ave (p-values)
AL 1988Q1 18.090 (0.0028) 6.229 (0.0027) 7.635 (0.0058)
AK 1975Q2 11.303 (0.0556) 3.521 (0.0359) 6.327 (0.0142)
AZ 1992Q4 14.925 (0.0117) 4.376 (0.0151) 4.209 (0.0686)
AR 1966Q3 21.251 (0.0007) 7.499 (0.0009) 6.875 (0.0097)
CA 1993Q2 13.283 (0.0241) 3.733 (0.0289) 5.377 (0.0283)
CO 1992Q1 15.53 (0.0090) 4.656 (0.0115) 5.309 (0.0297)
CT 1992Q1 9.997 (0.0948) 2.744 (0.0809) 3.133 (0.1593)
DE 1973Q4 7.378 (0.2573) 1.637 (0.2563) 2.347 (0.2953)
FL 1973Q4 15.858 (0.0078) 5.116 (0.0074) 6.965 (0.0091)
GA 1993Q1 24.735 (0.0001) 9.457 (0.0002) 9.488 (0.0064)
HI 1970Q3 15.634 (0.0086) 5.391 (0.0057) 7.674 (0.0056)
ID 1986Q3 13.728 (0.0198) 4.982 (0.0092) 6.883 (0.0096)
IL 1992Q1 34.945 (0.0000) 13.492 (0.0000) 11.177 (0.0007)
IN 1986Q1 11.993 (0.0417) 3.868 (0.0252) 4.327 (0.0626)
IA 1980Q3 8.237 (0.1878) 1.858 (0.2098) 3.049 (0.1701)
KS 1975Q2 10.306 (0.0837) 2.478 (0.1075) 1.795 (0.4505)
KY 1977Q3 8.461 (0.1726) 1.957 (0.1886) 2.637 (0.2352)
LA 1992Q3 22.466 (0.0004) 8.983 (0.0003) 10.107 (0.0013)
ME 1972Q3 21.358 (0.0006) 6.615 (0.0019) 2.206 (0.3294)
MD 1990Q2 20.317 (0.0010) 7.182 (0.0012) 9.301 (0.0021)
MA 1992Q1 52.294 (0.0000) 22.061 (0.0000) 8.947 (0.0025)
MI 1986Q1 12.012 (0.0414) 4.269 (0.0168) 5.595 (0.0241)
MN 1982Q4 13.668 (0.0204) 5.109 (0.0074) 7.543 (0.0062)
MS 1972Q2 12.795 (0.0297) 4.322 (0.0160) 4.179 (0.0702)
MO 1991Q4 10.539 (0.0761) 3.042 (0.0591) 4.026 (0.0791)
MT 1982Q2 14.609 (0.0135) 4.011 (0.0218) 4.715 (0.0465)
NE 1978Q3 8.171 (0.1925) 1.727 (0.2418) 2.592 (0.2438)
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NV 1992Q1 18.635 (0.0022) 6.464 (0.0022) 7.029 (0.0087)
NH 200Q2 22.924 (0.0001) 7.648 (0.0000) 7.192 (0.0004)
NJ 1991Q2 27.086 (0.0000) 10.532 (0.0000) 9.401 (0.0000)
NM 1978Q4 12.231 (0.0093) 3.427 (0.0085) 4.908 (0.0084)
NY 1988Q2 27.239 (0.0000) 8.887 (0.0000) 8.453 (0.0000)
NC 2000Q4 7.161 (0.0962) 1.497 (0.0990) 1.700 (0.1533)
ND 1981Q1 8.729 (0.0473) 2.058 (0.0490) 2.436 (0.0738)
OH 1989Q2 12.603 (0.0078) 4.304 (0.0020) 6.704 (0.0010)
OK 1978Q1 19.504 (0.0003) 5.284 (0.0002) 7.647 (0.0002)
OR 2000Q4 10.134 (0.0248) 1.828 (0.0651) 1.585 (0.1735)
PA 1989Q2 19.148 (0.0003) 6.218 (0.0000) 7.825 (0.0001)
RI 1993Q1 8.621 (0.0497) 1.999 (0.0527) 2.532 (0.0676)
SC 1975Q2 6.431 (0.1331) 0.993 (0.1986) 1.591 (0.1724)
SD 1975Q1 4.662 (0.2851) 0.502 (0.4389) 0.701 (0.4979)
TN 1978Q3 10.863 (0.0176) 3.256 (0.0073) 5.773 (0.0033)
TX 2000Q2 1.157 (0.3513) 0.878 (0.2363) 1.529 (0.1847)
UT 2001Q2 1.256 (0.9606) 0.141 (0.9177) 0.248 (0.8887)
VT 2000Q3 30.249 (0.0000) 10.584 (0.0000) 14.445 (0.0000)
VA 1969Q2 8.252 (0.0588) 1.035 (0.1867) 0.935 (0.3703)
WA 1993Q1 7.675 (0.0764) 2.100 (0.0466) 3.127 (0.0400)
WV 1981Q4 10.788 (0.0183) 1.926 (0.0577) 2.262 (0.0871)
WI 2000Q4 8.679 (0.0484) 2.506 (0.0284) 4.094 (0.0175)
WY 1983Q1 5.453 (0.2038) 0.725 (0.3006) 1.105 (0.3010)
Table 6: Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test results all 50 states: 1960:Q1-2012:Q4
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State Break Date Max (p-values) Exp (p-values) Ave (p-values)
AL 1988Q1 16.232 (0.0066) 5.143 (0.0072) 8.553 (0.0032)
AK 1975Q2 23.026 (0.0009) 7.069 (0.0049) 8.743 (0.0071)
AZ 2001Q2 9.861 (0.1001) 2.851 (0.0723) 4.231 (0.0674)
AR 1968Q3 21.331 (0.0006) 7.559 (0.0009) 7.260 (0.0074)
CA 2000Q4 16.604 (0.0055) 3.952 (0.0231) 4.939 (0.0392)
CO 2001Q2 25.932 (0.0001) 8.322 (0.0005) 6.033 (0.0175)
CT 2001Q2 11.678 (0.0476) 3.206 (0.0498) 4.366 (0.0608)
DE 2005Q1 16.364 (0.0062) 4.742 (0.0106) 5.767 (0.0212)
FL 1973Q4 24.249 (0.0002) 8.610 (0.0004) 10.472 (0.0011)
GA 2000Q3 14.291 (0.0155) 4.295 (0.0164) 5.903 (0.0192)
HI 1970Q3 20.351 (0.0010) 7.034 (0.0013) 9.099 (0.0023)
ID 1974Q2 11.042 (0.0620) 2.323 (0.1269) 3.642 (0.1067)
IL 1988Q2 13.533 (0.0216) 4.533 (0.0130) 5.643 (0.0232)
IN 1988Q1 11.888 (0.1081) 3.793 (0.0733) 5.966 (0.0555)
IA 1980Q3 11.088 (0.0608) 2.537 (0.1010) 3.666 (0.1047)
KS 1975Q2 11.130 (0.0598) 2.796 (0.0766) 2.332 (0.2987)
KY 1979Q2 13.391 (0.0230) 3.773 (0.0277) 4.648 (0.0192)
LA 1988Q1 19.568 (0.0014) 7.518 (0.0009) 9.268 (0.0021)
ME 1972Q3 14.282 (0.0156) 3.854 (0.0255) 4.568 (0.0520)
MD 1990Q2 22.633 (0.0003) 7.936 (0.0006) 9.588 (0.0017)
MA 1992Q1 16.998 (0.0046) 5.475 (0.0053) 4.919 (0.0398)
MI 1986Q1 10.184 (0.0879) 3.432 (0.0394) 5.996 (0.0180)
MN 1980Q3 11.241 (0.0571) 3.889 (0.0246 5.987 (0.0181)
MS 1972Q2 16.427 (0.0060) 5.536 (0.0050) 5.189 (0.0325)
MO 2004Q4 24.945 (0.0001) 9.907 (0.0002) 12.437 (0.0004)
MT 1982Q2 15.567 (0.0088) 4.329 (0.0159) 3.475 (0.1217)
NE 1978Q3 9.496 (0.1157) 1.862 (0.2089) 2.063 (0.3675)
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NV 2005Q1 13.215 (0.0248) 4.005 (0.0219) 4.462 (0.0416)
NH 2004Q4 22.511 (0.0004) 7.659 (0.008) 6.231 (0.0152)
NJ 1991Q2 20.538 (0.0009) 7.149 (0.0012) 8.253 (0.0039)
NM 2005Q1 12.395 (0.0352) 3.659 (0.0311) 4.969 (0.0383)
NY 1988Q2 15.484 (0.0092) 4.224 (0.0176) 5.425 (0.0273)
NC 1974Q2 11.740 (0.2297) 3.199 (0.2633) 4.290 (0.3565)
ND 1981Q1 11.762 (0.0459) 2.487 (0.1066) 2.535 (0.2550)
OH 1985Q3 14.215 (0.0160) 5.264 (0.0064) 7.662 (0.0057)
OK 1982Q3 38.578 (0.0000) 16.271 (0.0000) 14.123 (0.0002)
OR 2000Q4 11.319 (0.0553) 3.332 (0.0436) 4.839 (0.0423)
PA 1989Q2 22.934 (0.0003) 8.329 (0.0005) 9.378 (0.0020)
RI 2004Q1 11.272 (0.0563) 2.880 (0.0701) 3.899 (0.0873)
SC 1974Q2 10.037 (0.0933) 3.101 (0.0555) 5.469 (0.0264)
SD 1975Q1 5.199 (0.5276) 0.716 (0.7034) 1.129 (0.7201)
TN 1987Q2 13.932 (0.0182) 4.966 (0.0085) 8.165 (0.0041)
TX 1981Q4 7.603 (0.2373) 1.749 (0.2360) 2.723 (0.2196)
UT 2001Q3 11.718 (0.0468) 2.974 (0.0635) 2.702 (0.2237)
VT 2000Q3 28.124 (0.0000) 9.694 (0.0002) 14.081 (0.0002)
VA 1973Q3 14.037 (0.0173) 4.557 (0.0127) 6.665 (0.0112)
WA 2000Q2 22.120 (0.0048) 6.901 (0.0097) 9.051 (0.0180)
WV 1978Q3 19.815 (0.0013) 5.106 (0.0075) 2.524 (0.2572)
WI 1983Q2 10.184 (0.0879) 3.375 (0.0417) 5.259 (0.0308)
WY 1981Q1 6.946 (0.2997) 1.429 (0.3335) 1.821 (0.4416)
Table 7: Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test results all 50 states: 1960:Q1-2004:Q4
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Conclusion
Since the double-dip recession of the early 1980’s, there have been significant changes in
the nature of several important business cycle fluctuations. This work has focused on two
of those recent changes which have been less well understood; the Great Moderation, and
jobless recoveries. These phenomena are similar in that they have both generated a seizable
literature which has posited many competing explanations for their advents, yet no consensus
has been reached over time. With both jobless recoveries and the Great Moderation, past
empirical work has focused almost entirely on the national time-series data for the U.S.,
resulting in a relatively small number of observations.
This dissertation has sought movement towards a better understanding of the causes of
both jobless recoveries and the Great Moderation by using state-level data to test the existing
hypotheses on their respective causes. The use of data from the fifty state economies provides
a much greater number of observations which may be desirable for statistical work. In both
cases, the panel analysis results find support for some hypotheses, and fail to find support for
others. This helps to narrow down the field of competing explanations for both the jobless
recovery and Great Moderation phenomena, hopefully leading to a better understanding of
the true causes of each.
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